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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

INDEPENDENT CLINICAL TRIALS TO TEST DRUGS:
THE NEGLECTED REFORM
MARC A. RODWIN*
I. DRUG MANUFACTURER CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Drug manufacturers face a fundamental conflict of interest. Pursuit of
profit compromises their impartial assessment of their drugs’ benefits and
risks.1 Their biased evaluation can corrupt public knowledge of drugs, lead
to marketing unsafe and/or ineffective drugs, and undermine rational
physician prescribing.2 Over the last century, federal regulation has
mitigated but not eliminated this problem, which corrupts drug therapy and
medical practice.3

* Marc A. Rodwin, J.D., Ph.D. Lab Fellow, Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics, Harvard
University and Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. Research was funded by the
research laboratory on institutional corruption, Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics, Harvard
University and a Suffolk University Law School summer research grant. Patrick O’Leary, J.D.
candidate at Harvard Law School did a stellar job of assisting me by reviewing Congressional
hearings on drug policy. Dr. Philip R. Lee provided helpful comments on a draft.
1. The conflicts of drug firms are part conflicts of interest that affect medical practice in
general. See MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY, AND MORALS; PHYSICIANS’ CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST (1993); MARC A. RODWIN, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND THE FUTURE OF MEDICINE: THE
UNITED STATES, FRANCE AND JAPAN (2011) [hereinafter RODWIN, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND THE
FUTURE OF MEDICINE].
2. Marc A. Rodwin, Conflicts of Interest, Institutional Corruption, and Pharma: An
Agenda for Reform, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 511, 511 (2012) [hereinafter Rodwin, Institutional
Corruption and Pharma].
3. There is a growing literature analyzing problems with drug safety and current practices
in pharmaceutical industry research and marketing. See generally JOHN ABRAMSON,
OVERDO$ED AMERICA: THE BROKEN PROMISE OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (2004); MARCIA ANGELL,
THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: HOW THEY DECEIVE US AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT
(2004); JERRY AVORN, POWERFUL MEDICINES: THE BENEFITS, RISKS AND COSTS OF PRESCRIPTION
DRUGS (2004); HOWARD BRODY, HOOKED: ETHICS, THE MEDICAL PROFESSION, AND THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY (2007); Carl Elliott, The Drug Pushers, ATLANTIC, April 2006,
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/print/2006/04/the-drug-pushers/304714/; MarcAndré Gagnon, Corporate Influence Over Clinical Research: Considering the Alternatives, 21
PRESCRIRE INT’L 191 (2012); MERRILL GOOZNER, THE $800 MILLION PILL: THE TRUTH BEHIND THE
COST OF NEW DRUGS (2004); DAVID HEALY, PHARMAGEDDON (2012); Joel Lexchin, The Medical
Profession and the Pharmaceutical Industry: An Unhealthy Alliance, 18 INT’L J. HEALTH SERVICES
603 (1988); DONALD W. LIGHT, THE RISKS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS (2010); THOMAS J. MOORE,
113
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Today, the federal government counters this conflict of interest in several
ways. First, legislation precludes introducing drugs in interstate commerce
unless the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) finds that the drug’s sponsor
has demonstrated that the drug is safe and effective for a designated use.4 It
prohibits the firm from marketing the drug for any other use.
Second, the FDA requires that drug sponsors demonstrate safety and
efficacy by submitting data from clinical trials on human research subjects.5
Typically, in the trial, one group of individuals is treated with the test drug
and a control group is treated with a placebo or an alternative drug
therapy.6
The FDA also oversees the conduct of clinical research used to support
applications to market a drug referred to as new drug applications or NDAs.
Regulations counter the risk of fraud and unreliable research. They establish
standards for research methods, record keeping, and data reporting.7 In
addition, the FDA inspects toxicological laboratories and facilities that
conduct clinical trials to monitor compliance with these standards.8
Nevertheless, the conflicts of interest persist because the firm that seeks
to market a drug designs and controls the clinical trials used to test its safety
and efficacy. The FDA relies upon these trials when it evaluates whether or
not to authorize marketing the drug. An ample record reveals that drug firms
can design clinical trials in ways that bias the conclusions.9 They can also
misinterpret or misreport the trial data, or engage in fraud.10
PRESCRIPTION FOR DISASTER: THE HIDDEN DANGERS IN YOUR MEDICINE CABINET (1998); RAY
MOYNIHAN & ALAN CASSELS, SELLING SICKNESS: HOW THE WORLD’S BIGGEST PHARMACEUTICAL
COMPANIES ARE TURNING US ALL INTO PATIENTS (2005); Sergio Sismondo, Ghost Management:
How Much of the Medical Literature Is Shaped Behind the Scenes by the Pharmaceutical
Industry?, 4 PLOS MED. 1429 (2007). Some scholars, however, argue that that the United
States overregulates the pharmaceutical industry. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, OVERDOSE: HOW
EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT REGULATION STIFLES PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION (2006).
4. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)-(b) (2006). This Act, the
FDCA, regulates the sale of drugs in interstate commerce. Id. § 355(a). In theory, a physician,
other individual, or firm could market a drug in only one state and avoid federal regulation
under the FDCA. For the most in depth study of the FDA, see DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION
AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA (2010).
5. 21 C.F.R. § 312.58(a) (2012).
6. 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(a)(2).
7. 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.57, 314.126.
8. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: GOOD LABORATORY PRACTICES,
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 7 (2007), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ICECI/
EnforcementActions/BioresearchMonitoring/ucm133748.pdf; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
INFORMATION SHEET GUIDANCE FOR IRBS, CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS, AND SPONSORS: FDA
INSPECTIONS OF CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS 2 (2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/down
loads/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM126553.pdf.
9. Dummond Rennie, When Evidence Isn’t: Trials, Drug Companies and the FDA, 15 J.L.
& POL’Y 991, 1007-08 (2007). See also Harlan M. Krumholz & Joseph S. Ross, A Model for

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2012]

INDEPENDENT CLINICAL TRIALS TO TEST DRUGS

115

Drug firm bias can slant research performed in house and also the
clinical research conducted by external researchers that drug firms finance
or manage. In fact, today to conduct clinical research drug firms typically
rely mainly on researchers who are not full time company employees.11 They
engage Contract Research Organizations (CROs) or university-based
researchers to carry out clinical trials and/or to perform some or all of the
analysis.12 They may also contract with specialists to design trials.13 Having
third parties conduct the research does not eliminate corrupting influences
for a simple reason. The drug sponsor chooses who will conduct the trials
and these researchers depend on sponsoring firm for their income; they
therefore have incentives to advance the goals of the drug firm that employs
them and to follow its directives.14 In addition, these researchers report to
the drug sponsor, not to the FDA or the equivalent regulatory authority in
other countries.15 They cannot report their results or their analysis separately
to governmental authorities.16
This article explores a reform proposal that precludes bias in clinical
trials used to test drugs. Simply stated, it removes all drug firm influence on
the design and conduct of clinical trials used to decide whether to allow
marketing of a drug. Recently advocated by several leaders in drug policy
and research, this reform proposal has a long history, but was neglected for
over half a century due to pharmaceutical industry opposition, and so the
federal government pursued alternative strategies to counter bias, which
proved ineffective.17 When regulation of manufacturer controlled clinical
trials failed to eliminate bias, flawed practice, and fraud, public officials
increased oversight relying on the same flawed approach.18
It would not be surprising if contemporary scandals galvanize support
for a new round of reforms. Neither would it be remarkable if responsible
pharmaceutical industry leaders and public officials supported stricter

Dissemination and Independent Analysis of Industry Data, 306 JAMA 1593, 1593-94 (2011);
see also Marcia Angell, Industry-Sponsored Clinical Research: A Broken System, 300 JAMA
1069, 1069-71 (2008).
10. Rennie, supra note 9, at 994-96.
11. See Thomas Bodenheimer, Uneasy Alliance: Clinical Investigators and the
Pharmaceutical Industry, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1539, 1539-40 (2000).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1541.
14. Id. at 1543.
15. See Christine D. Galbraith, Dying to Know: A Demand for Genuine Public Access to
Clinical Trial Results Data, 78 MISS. L.J. 705, 754 (2009).
16. See id.
17. Id. at 712; Angell, supra note 9, at 1071; PETER TEMIN, TAKING YOUR MEDICINE: DRUG
REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 2-5 (1980).
18. TEMIN, supra note 17, at 29.
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oversight using the same paradigm. Nor will it be unexpected when the next
generation of halfway reforms yields only minor improvements while drug
firms develop new means to influence clinical trials. The corruption lies at
the root: drug firm control over clinical trials, and so to be effective, reforms
need to eliminate this problem.19
A.

Options for Control of Clinical Trials

The chart below displays a typology of six key options for addressing
conflicts of interest in clinical trials. The left end of the spectrum grants the
drug sponsor complete control and ignores its conflict of interest. At the
right end of the spectrum, the federal government conducts the clinical
trials. Between these two poles are four strategies that public policy can
employ individually or in various combinations. The FDA’s regulatory regime
has evolved over time, but it relies on the second strategy, supplemented in
recent years by the fourth strategy.
STRATEGIES TO ADDRESS DRUG SPONSOR CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
IN CLINICAL TRIALS
Maximum Manufacturer Control
1
Drug firms
conduct
clinical
trials with
little
regulation.

2
FDA
regulates
and
oversees
clinical
trials
conducted
by drug
firms.

3
Government
or private
entity certifies
clinical
researchers.
Drug firms
conduct
clinical trials
using
certified
researchers.

Maximum Government Control
4
Government
promotes
transparency
by requiring:
 Registration
of trials;
 Disclosure
of clinical
study
reports; or
 Disclosure
of patient
level data.

5
Government
selects
independent
entities to
conduct
clinical trials.

6
Government
agency
conducts
clinical trials.

19. The concept of institutional corruption has been developed by Lawrence Lessig and
Dennis Thompson. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS –
AND A PLAN TO STOP IT 226-47 (2011); Dennis F. Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption:
Making Campaigns Safe for Democracy, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1036 (2005); DENNIS F.
THOMPSON, ETHICS IN CONGRESS: FROM INDIVIDUAL TO INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION (1995). For
a review of institutional corruption and the pharmaceutical industry, see generally Rodwin,
Institutional Corruption and Pharma, supra note 2. Several researchers at the Edmond J. Safra
Center, Harvard University, are analyzing institutional corruption in the pharmaceutical
economy and other areas of public life. See The Lab at Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics,
HARVARD UNIV., http://www.ethics.harvard.edu/lab (last visited Dec. 20, 2012).
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The first option — really the absence of a strategy — allows the drug
firm to conduct clinical trials without interference. It refrains from addressing
its conflict of interest. The second strategy — the main one used today —
has the FDA regulate and oversee clinical trials conducted by drug firms.
The regulations set standards to promote reliable research.
A third strategy requires that only certified research organizations and
researchers conduct clinical trials. A fourth strategy requires transparency to
facilitate public review of clinical trial methods, analysis, and results. Since
2007, the United States has required registration of clinical trials to promote
transparency.20
A fifth strategy removes drug firm bias by having the federal government
select independent organizations and researchers to design and conduct
clinical trials. Researchers would not depend on drug firms to select them
and so would lack incentives to favor the drug firm. A sixth strategy has a
governmental institution or agency design and conduct clinical trials.
20. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, §
801(a), 121 Stat. 823, 905-08 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 282 (2006)). The push for
registration of clinical trials emerged after studies showed the presence of biased information
in the published literature evaluating drugs, resulting from bias in the clinical studies that were
published. See An-Wen Chan et al., Empirical Evidence for Selective Reporting of Outcomes in
Randomized Trials: Comparison of Protocols to Published Articles, 291 JAMA 2457 (2004).
Drug firms published studies with positive results in several forms but buried studies with results
that showed drugs were not very effective or that they posed high risks. This led medical
journal editors to promote registration of clinical trials to increase access to data from
unpublished clinical trials. Id. at 2462. In 2004, the International Committee of Medical
Journal Editors agreed that their journals would not publish clinical trial results unless the
researchers had registered the trial before patients enrolled in the trial. See Kay Dickersin &
Drummond Rennie, Registering Clinical Trials, 290 JAMA 516 (2003); Editorial, Clinical Trial
Registration: A Statement from the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, 351
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1250 (2004). The committee of editors decided that registries should
include data specified by the World Health Organization. International Clinical Trials Registry
Platform (ICTRP), WORLD HEALTH ORG. (2012), http://www.who.int/ictrp/network/trds/en/
index.html. Current law requires registering Phase 2 and higher trials of drugs and biologicals
on the Clinical-Trials.gov website if the trial is part of an FDA investigational new drug
application, or if there is a trial site in the United States. Researchers must post key results
within a year after the completion of collecting data. However, they have up to three years to
post results for studies of off-label drug uses (i.e, uses other than those the FDA has
approved). Nevertheless, registration practice falls short of what the law requires. Sylvain
Mathieu et al., Comparison of Registered and Published Primary Outcomes in Randomized
Controlled Trials, 302 JAMA 977 (2009); Michael R. Law et al., Despite Law, Fewer Than
One in Eight Completed Studies Of Drugs and Biologics are Reported on Time on
ClinicalTrials.gov, 30 HEALTH AFF. 2338 (2011). Moreover, current law and policy impedes
access to information on drug safety. See Aaron S. Kesselheim & Michelle M. Mello,
Confidentiality Laws and Secrecy in Medical Research: Improving Public Access to Data on
Drug Safety, 26 HEALTH AFF. 483 (2007).
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Until now, almost all efforts to address the drug sponsor’s conflict of
interest employed the second strategy and set standards for the conduct of
laboratory testing and clinical trials.21 The federal government could bolster
the second strategy with different kinds of rules. Regulations could that the
drug sponsor’s proposed protocol and research design be reviewed by
independent experts selected by the FDA. Based on the peer review, the FDA
could then require that the sponsor revise the protocol and research design.
Other regulations could oversee financial relations between the drug
sponsor and researchers. They could preclude individuals and firms from
conducting a trial if they have significant conflicts of interest arising from
other financial ties with the drug company. They could also set standards for
compensation of firms and individuals.
Some reformers in the 1960s and 1970s advocated certification of
researchers — the third strategy — but the United States has not pursued
this approach.22 Regulations could require that only certified individual
researchers and organizations conduct drug trials used to support NDAs.
They could authorize the federal government or private organizations to
certify researchers. Regulations could require training, experience, and other
qualifications for certification. They could create a system to revoke
certification from individuals and firms that engaged in misconduct or
violated rules. They could preclude individuals and firms from conducting
trials when they have designated conflicts of interest such as financial ties
with pharmaceutical firms whose products they test.
To strengthen the transparency strategy, regulations could require that
drug sponsors and their researchers make public the clinical study report,
which drug firms now produce to comply with international standards and
FDA rules.23 Clinical study reports contain key information related to the
21. See Tomas J. Philipson & Eric Sun, Is the Food and Drug Administration Safe and
Effective? 6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13561, 2007).
22. See, e.g., Committee on Public Health, The Importance of Clinical Testing in
Determining the Efficacy and Safety of Drugs, 38 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED. 415, 433-34 (1962).
Although the United States does not certify researchers for drug testing, the FDA can bar
researchers from conducting clinical trials used to support new drug applications. 21 C.F.R. §
312.70 (2012).
23. See INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HARMONISATION OF TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR
REGISTRATION OF PHARMACEUTICALS FOR HUMAN USE, GUIDELINE FOR INDUSTRY: STRUCTURE AND
CONTENT OF CLINICAL STUDY REPORTS; see also International Conference on Harmonisation:
Guideline on Structure and Content of Clinical Study Reports; Availability, 61 Fed. Reg.
37,320 (July 17, 1996). John Abramson and I have called for legislation to require
mandatory disclosure of clinical study reports for FDA approved drugs. See Marc A. Rodwin &
John D. Abramson, Clinical Trial Data as a Public Good, 308 JAMA 871 (2012). See also
Peter Doshi et al., The Imperative to Share Clinical Study Reports: Recommendations from the
Tamiflu Experience, 9 PLOS MED. e1001201 (2012). Recently, the European Medicines
Agency has started to make clinical trial reports available when they are requested under
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clinical trial, including: the study protocol, the designated clinical end
points, discussion of methods and statistical analysis, tabulated data, and
analysis of data. Regulations could also require disclosure of clinical trial
patient level data. Making public detailed information on clinical trials
would allow independent researchers to review the analysis or to perform
their own evaluation. Proponents of this approach say it would make it
harder for drug sponsors to hide risks from the public and also help hold the
FDA accountable for its decisions.24
New regulations that advanced the second, third, and fourth strategies
could reduce the risk of fraud or bias and improve the design and
implementation of clinical trials. However they would not remove the bias
inherent in drug sponsor influence over the trials. Consequently, some critics
have proposed ending the drug sponsor’s control over clinical trials used by
the FDA to evaluate drugs.25 This reform can be implemented through the
fifth strategy, having the federal government contract with independent
organizations to design and conduct clinical trials, or through the sixth
strategy, having the federal government conduct the clinical trials. Under
most formulations of these proposals, the drug firm that wishes to market
the drug pays the cost of the trials, just as they currently do. Some people,
however, propose that the pharmaceutical industry collectively finance the
trials;26 others propose that the federal government share the costs of testing
a drug either with the pharmaceutical industry collectively or with the
sponsor of the drug.27
Governmental oversight of clinical trials is part of broader regulation of
pharmaceutical firms to manage their conflicts of interest. To understand
proposals to reform the conduct of clinical trials, it will help to review how
public authorities have regulated drug firms over the last century.
public disclosure statutes. See Press Release, Eur. Meds. Agency, European Medicines Agency
Widens Public Access to Documents, (Nov. 30, 2010), available at http://www.ema.europa.
eu/ema/index.jsp?curl=pages/news_and_events/news/2010/11/news_detail_001158.jsp&mi
d=WC0b01ac058004d5c1 (2010). See also Peter Doshi & Tom Jefferson, The First 2 Years
of the European Medicines Agency’s Policy on Access to Documents: Secret No Longer,
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED., Dec. 19, 2012, at E1 (reviewing data from the first 2 years of the
EMA’s access policy and finding diversity in the requestor affiliation).
24. See Krumholz & Ross, supra note 9, at 1593-94.
25. See a discussion of contemporary proposals infra Part III. Angell, supra note 9, at
1071; Marcia Angell & Arnold S. Relman, Patents, Profits & American Medicine: Conflicts of
Interest in the Testing & Marketing of New Drugs, DAEDALUS, Spring 2002, at 102, 111;
ANGELL, supra note 3, at 245.
26. Interagency Coordination in Drug Research and Regulation: Agency Coordination
Study, Part 4: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Reorganization and Int’l Org. of the S.
Comm. on Government Operations, 88th Cong. 1620 (1963) [hereinafter Drug Research and
Regulation Hearings, Part 4]; ANGELL, supra note 3, at 245.
27. See infra Part II, III (discussing contemporary proposals).
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II. COPING WITH DRUG FIRM CONFLICTS OF INTEREST:
A HISTORY OF U.S. DRUG REGULATION
In the beginning of the twentieth century, there were no effective
institutional means to control pharmaceutical firm conflicts of interest. The
law allowed a drug market premised on laissez-faire.28 Manufacturers could
sell directly to consumers any product and make any therapeutic claim.
Manufacturers were not required to test their drugs for safety or efficacy, or
even to disclose the ingredients. Many products marketed as medicines
lacked active ingredients. Other products, sold without prescriptions and
often without the contents being disclosed, included narcotics, alcohol, or
other dangerous substances.29 Patients and physicians lacked the ability to
evaluate drugs or choose among them. Firms did not engage in anything
similar to contemporary drug development or clinical trials.
There were two categories of drugs. The first, referred to as ethical
drugs, were listed in the U.S. Pharmacopeia or in the National Formulary,
and consisted of drugs that the physicians and pharmacists considered
reliable.30 In practice, these drugs were substances that were in the public
domain, and hence not patented, although there was no reason why an
individual or firm that invented a new drug could not patent it.31 Multiple
firms produced and sold them to physicians and pharmacists in a form
ready for use.32 In addition, pharmacists and physicians often obtained the
raw ingredients and compounded these medicines.33 Among the
approximately 200 drugs in these formularies, about a dozen are
considered valuable today, most notably: morphine, digitalis, quinine,
diphtheria antitoxin, aspirin, and ether.34

28. For a history of food and drug law and the FDA see PHILIP J. HILTS, PROTECTING
AMERICA’S HEALTH; THE FDA, BUSINESS, AND ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF REGULATION 11-94
(2003); see HARRY F. DOWLING, MEDICINES FOR MAN: THE DEVELOPMENT, REGULATION, AND USE
OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS 187-212, 230-32 (1970); see also TEMIN, supra note 17, at 23.
29. TEMIN, supra note 17, at 23-25, 32-33.
30. Id. at 24; James L.J Nuzzo, Independent Prescribing Authority of Advanced Practice
Nurses: A Threat to the Public Health?, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 35, 36 (1998).
31. Nuzzo, supra note 30, at 36.
32. Id.; Glenn Sonnedecker, Contribution of the Pharmaceutical Profession Toward
Controlling the Quality of Drugs in the Nineteenth Century, in SAFEGUARDING THE PUBLIC:
HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF MEDICINAL DRUG CONTROL 97, 108 (John B. Blake ed., 1970).
33. Sonnedecker, supra note 32, at 99.
34. TEMIN, supra note 17, at 24, 59. All of these drugs, with the exception of Aspirin,
were added to the Pharmacopeia in the early 20th century. Aspirin was added at a later date.
UNITED STATES PHARMACOPEIAL CONVENTION, THE PHARMACOPEIA OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 122-24, 393 (1905). Morphine was added in 1907. UNITED STATES PHARMACOPEIAL
CONVENTION, THE PHARMACOPEIA OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 293 (1907).
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The second category of drugs was proprietary medicines, often referred
to as patent medicines or secret nostrums.35 These were actually not
patented but branded products, and the brand name was protected as a
trademark.36 Ingredients and production methods were secret. Later analysis
revealed that many consisted mainly of water or alcohol. Some contained
morphine or opium.37 Firms marketed these drugs directly to consumers,
typically through newspaper advertising, and also to pharmacies and
physicians who resold them to patients.38
A.

The Rise of Drug Regulation

Reform came slowly. The American Medical Association (AMA) had
opposed the sale of patent remedies/secret nostrums since its founding in
1847.39 The AMA Code declared it unethical for doctors to use or vouch for
such drugs.40 Not until 1905, however, did the AMA have sufficient
resources to cease advertising patent medicines in its medical journal and to
institute a private system of drug regulation.41 Then, the AMA decided to
advertise only drugs that it approved.42 It approved only drugs marketed
exclusively to physicians that listed all active ingredients on the label but that
did not include information that would allow patients to medicate
themselves. The AMA analyzed these drugs to confirm that the label listed
the contents accurately.43
Reformers and muckrakers — supported by the AMA — spearheaded
federal drug regulation.44 In 1906, Congress passed the Pure Food and
Drug Act, which required manufacturers to disclose therapeutic ingredients
on the drug label and prohibited the sale of adulterated, misbranded, or
deleterious products.45 The presumption was that with accurate labeling,
35. The leading study of the proprietary medicine market prior to the 1938 FDCA is
JAMES HARVEY YOUNG, THE TOADSTOOL MILLIONAIRES: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF PATENT MEDICINES
IN AMERICA BEFORE FEDERAL REGULATION (1961).
36. Nuzzo, supra note 30, at 36.
37. TEMIN, supra note 17, at 25.
38. Id. at 25-26; see, e.g., Peter Temin, Technology, Regulation, and Market Structure in
the Modern Pharmaceutical Industry, 10 BELL J. ECON. 429, 441 (1979).
39. Nuzzo, supra note 30, at 36.
40. Id.
41. See TEMIN, supra note 17, at 29.
42. For a history of the AMA regulation of drugs see DOWLING, supra note 28, at 153185. See also, RODWIN, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND THE FUTURE OF MEDICINE, supra note 1, at
85-90, 102-06.
43. Marc A. Rodwin, Drug Advertising, Continuing Medical Education, and Physician
Prescribing: A Historical Review and Reform Proposal, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 807, 808 (2010).
44. See DOWLING, supra note 28, at 155-56; see also HILTS, supra note 28, at 52.
45. Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, § 8, 34 Stat. 768, 770. For a
review of the history and analysis of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act see Richard A. Merrill,
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individuals could safely choose drugs. Advertising of therapeutic claims
remained unregulated until amendments in 1912 prohibited false and
fraudulent statements regarding the curative or therapeutic effect.46
Despite these reforms, in 1929, proprietary medicines accounted for
half of drug sales, and patients could purchase drugs without prescriptions,
except for narcotics.47 At the end of the 1930s, only a handful of companies
produced drugs that had any therapeutic value.48 They had not invested in
or discovered these drugs and they did not conduct any research to develop
and test new products. Henry Gadsden testified before Congress that when
he joined Merck in 1937, “you could count the basic medicines on the
fingers of your two hands. Our own . . . catalog did not carry a single
exclusive prescription medicine . . . . Most of our products were sold without
a prescription. And 43 percent of the prescription medicines were
compounded by the pharmacist . . . .”49
The Roosevelt administration sponsored legislation to regulate drugs in
1933, but industry opposition blocked its enactment until a scandal
galvanized popular support. In 1937, the Massengill Company added a
chemical to improve the flavor of a sulfa-based drug called sulfanilamide.
The chemical proved toxic and killed at least 106 people who ingested the
drug.50 Congress then ended the laissez-faire drug regime by passing the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).
The legislation required firms to seek permission to market drugs in
interstate commerce from the FDA and allowed the FDA 60 days to deny
authorization if it found that the drug was dangerous or improperly
labeled.51 Manufacturers no longer had unchecked authority to sell drugs.52

The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753 (1996);
see also Peter Barton Hutt, The Regulation of Drug Products by the United States Food and
Drug Administration, in THE TEXTBOOK OF PHARMACEUTICAL MEDICINE 565-601 (John P. Griffin
& John O’Grady eds., 5th ed. 2006).
46. Pure Food Act Amendment of 1912, Pub. L. No. 62-301, 37 Stat. 416, 416-17.
47. TEMIN, supra note 17, at 38, 46.
48. See Peter Temin, The Origin of Compulsory Drug Prescriptions, 22 J.L. & ECON. 91,
105 (1979); see 1920s and 1930s: Salving with Science, AM. CHEM. SOC’Y (2000),
http://www2.uah.es/farmamol/The%20Pharmaceutical%20Century/Ch2.html.
49. TEMIN, supra note 17, at 59.
50. Id. at 40-42.
51. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, § 505, 52 Stat. 1040,
1052 (1938).
52. See TEMIN, supra note 17, at 42. The 1938 Act did not regulate drug adverting, but
other legislation granted the Federal Trade Commission power to stop firms from making false
claims in advertising if they could show intent to defraud or mislead. Id.
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These changes created incentives for drug firms to conduct research and to
evaluate their products.53
B.

1962 FDCA Amendments Standards for Clinical Trials

The marketing of Thalidomide led to the birth of children with severe
deformations in multiple countries and created pressure for Congress to
pass the 1962 Kefauver-Harris Amendments to the FDCA.54 The legislation
removed the deadline for the FDA to review marketing applications; since
then, firms cannot market drugs unless the FDA grants approval.55
The 1962 amendments require drug sponsors to demonstrate that drugs
are effective, not only safe.56 It authorizes the FDA to withdraw its approval
for drugs already on the market based on new evidence;57 manufacturers
are required to track drug distribution to facilitate recalls of unsafe products
and to follow FDA standards for good manufacturing practices.58
The law restricts promotion to therapeutic uses approved by the FDA.
Promotional materials must note risks, as well as benefits, and summarize
side effects and contraindications.59 The FDA specifies what information the
label must include and labels must state the generic as well as the brand
name.60
The law requires that manufacturers receive FDA permission to use new
drugs in experiments before they begin tests for a NDA.61 It empowers the
FDA to require a manufacturer to carry out follow-up safety studies after it
grants marketing approval;62 it requires that manufacturers report to the
FDA any information they receive on suspected adverse drug events.63

53. The 1938 Act did not state that firms had to show their drugs were effective. See
generally Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, § 505, 52 Stat. 1040,
1052 (1938). However, the FDA’s view was that in order to decide whether a drug was safe it
needed to consider its therapeutic benefits. Temin, supra note 48, at 103-04. FDA scientists
believed they should tolerate a higher level of risks for drugs that would alleviate a serious
medical problem than for a drug that produced little or no therapeutic benefit. See TEMIN,
supra note 17, 48-49.
54. Jerry Avorn, Learning about the Safety of Drugs – A Half-Century of Evolution, 365
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2151, 2151-52 (2011); see also Merrill, supra note 45, at 1764; HILTS,
supra note 28, at 144-65; Hutt, supra note 45, at 569.
55. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 104, 76 Stat. 780, 784.
56. Id. § 102(a).
57. Id. § 102(e).
58. Id. §§ 101, 103.
59. Id. § 131(a).
60. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, §§ 112, 131, 76 Stat. 780, 790,
791.
61. Id. § 103(b).
62. See id. § 102(d).
63. See id. § 102(d).
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The law and subsequent regulations set a new standard to demonstrate
safety and effectiveness and this created the contemporary system used to
conduct clinical trials. These rules replaced a haphazard system of testing
that often consisted of testimonials based on the clinical experience of
researchers or the experience and opinions of physicians whom drug firms
deemed to be experts. In its place, the regulations require drug firms to
submit “substantial evidence” based on “adequate and well controlled”
scientific experiments carried out by “experts qualified by scientific
training.”64 The FDA worked with the pharmaceutical industry and clinical
researchers to create standards for testing drugs, and in 1970, issued
regulations on the conduct of clinical trials used to evaluate drugs.65
Before beginning clinical trials, researchers identify potentially
therapeutic molecules and conduct pre-clinical research.66 Typically they are
guided by information and theories, which suggest that changing a
biological process might alleviate a medical problem. Based on this
groundwork, researchers search for molecules that affect these biological
processes.67 They test the molecules that are the active ingredients in
medicines in a laboratory to identify their effects on chemicals, cells, or
tissues.68
After the researchers identify a promising molecule, the FDA requires
firms to test drugs, initially in animals and then in humans. First, researchers
64. Id.
[T]he term ‘substantial evidence’ means consisting of adequate and well-controlled
investigations, including clinical investigations, by experts qualified by scientific training
and experience to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug involved, on the basis of which
it could fairly and responsibly be concluded by such experts that the drug will have the
effect it purports or is represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed,
recommended, or suggested in the labeling or proposed labeling thereof. Id.
65. Hearing Regulations and Regulations Describing Scientific Content of Adequate and
Well-Controlled Clinical Investigations, 35 Fed. Reg. 7250, 7250 (May 8, 1970) (codified at
21 C.F.R. 146). For a careful study of the how clinical trials and clinical research developed,
see HARRY M. MARKS, THE PROGRESS OF EXPERIMENT: SCIENCE AND THERAPEUTIC REFORM IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1900-1990 (2000).
66. For a description and history of the process used for drug development and testing
drugs, see SUSAN ALDRIDGE, MAGIC MOLECULES: HOW DRUGS WORK 23-52 (1998); see JÜRGEN
DREWS, IN QUEST OF TOMORROW’S MEDICINES 71-115 (2003). For a succinct review, see
Richard E. Rowberg, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30913, PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT: A DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF THE PROCESS (2001). See also, Science &
Research: Proposed New Drug, Antibiotic, and Biological Product Regulations, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN. (1983), www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/RunningClinicalTrials/
ucm119443.htm [hereinafter FDA, Proposed New Regulations].
67. See FDA, Proposed New Regulations, supra note 66.
68. See PACIFIC BIOLABS, PRECLINICAL TOXICOLOGY, GUIDANCE FOR THE INDUSTRY 5-6, 20
(1997), available at http://www.pacificbiolabs.com/downloads/booklet%20preclinical%20tox
%20guidance.pdf.
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test the drug in animals at various doses to identify whether it is toxic.69 They
also may note its potential therapeutic effects.70 If a molecule is not highly
toxic in animals, researchers can proceed to test the drug in humans in
clinical trials divided into three phases.71 In the first phase of clinical trials
researchers test the drug to a small number of human subjects to determine
whether it is toxic in humans, and if so at what doses. Those studies yield
information about what does human can tolerate the drug without
immediate health risks. If the drug appears safe enough to continue testing,
researchers conduct a second phase clinical trial in a larger group of
patients to measure its benefits and risk.72 If a molecule still shows promise,
researchers can proceed to the third phase, a controlled clinical trial that
tests a drug’s safety and effectiveness in a larger number of human research
subjects.73
Phase three clinical trials evaluate a drug by comparing its use in test
subjects with a control group. Typically, the control group uses a placebo or
an alternative therapy.74 Protocols specify a process for randomly assigning
subjects to test and control groups in order to preclude bias in assignment
of individuals among the groups.75 The study must generally be double
blind.76 That is, the medication must be coded so that neither the physician
administering it nor the test subject knows which individuals receive the test
drug or the placebo or standard therapy to which it is compared until the
code is broken after collection of the data.77 The protocols must specify
methods for making and recording observations and methods for statistical
analysis.78 Firms must provide extensive documentation and submit raw data
and analysis as well as the results.79
These regulations greatly improved the quality of drug testing. It spurred
the development of new research methods and a clinical research industry.80
69. Investigational New Drug Application, 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.22, 312.23 (2012).
70. Id. § 312.23.
71. Id. § 312.21(a).
72. Id.
73. Id. § 312.21(c).
74. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a). In some situations the control group could be patients
that receive no treatment or historical data on the progress of an illness. Id. §
312.32(c)(1)(i)(C).
75. Id. § 312.23(a)(5)(iii).
76. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: E9 STATISTICAL PRINCIPLES FOR
CLINICAL TRIALS 11 (1998).
77. Id.
78. 21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a)(6)(iii)(f).
79. See id. § 312.23(a)(8).
80. Margaret Hamburg, 50 Years after Thalidomide: Why Regulation Matters, U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN. VOICE (Feb. 7, 2012), http://blogs.fda.gov/fdavoice/index.php/2012/02/50years-after-thalidomide-why-regulation-matters/.
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Market analysts estimated the CRO market to be $24 billion in 2010 and
growing by 15%.81 Nevertheless, since the 1970 regulations went into
effect, there have been three sorts of problems: fraud, poor quality, and
bias.82 Therefore, several contemporary researchers, physicians, and
advocates contend that drug-firm control over clinical research
compromises our knowledge and public safety.
III. CONTEMPORARY PROPOSALS FOR INDEPENDENT DRUG TESTING
In the last two decades, several authors have called for having an
independent entity, rather than drug manufacturers, design and conduct
clinical trials to test drugs. Dr. Marcia Angell argues that we should not
permit drug firms to control tests of their products.83 She proposes the
creation of an Institute for Prescription Drug Trials within the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) that would oversee the clinical trials.84 NIH would
contract with independent researchers at universities to carry out the
research.85 The data would belong to the institute and the researchers, and
the results would be made public.86 Researchers would be permitted to use
the data for publications.87 The FDA would rely on these studies to decide
whether to authorize marketing of the drug.88 Drug firms would be assessed
a percentage of their gross revenues to fund the institute.89
In a similar vein, doctors Wayne Ray, Marie Griffin, and Jerry Avorn
proposed creating a governmental center to assess drug effectiveness and
compare the costs and benefits of alternative drug therapies.90 They argue

81. See MAYSOUN DIMACHKIE MASRI ET AL., CONTRACT RESEARCH ORGANIZATIONS: AN
INDUSTRY ANALYSIS 5 (2012), available at http://www.guidestarclinical.com/whitepapers/CON
TRACT%20RESEARCH%20ORGANIZATIONS%20AN%20INDUSTRY%20ANALYSIS.pdf (citing
BIOPHARM RESEARCH PUBL’G, CONTRACT RESEARCH ANNUAL REVIEW 2011 (2011)). For analysis of
the forces creating this industry, see generally Richard A. Rettig, The Industrialization of Clinical
Research, HEALTH AFF., Mar. – Apr. 2000, at 129.
82. See Sidney Shapiro, Divorcing Profit Motivation from New Drug Research: A
Consideration of Proposals to Provide the FDA with Reliable Test Data, 1978 DUKE L.J. 155,
181; see Sean R. Tunis et al., Practical Clinical Trials: Increasing the Value of Clinical
Research for Decision Making in Clinical and Health Policy, 290 JAMA 1624, 1624 (2003).
83. ANGELL, supra note 3, at 245.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 245, 247.
87. Id. at 245.
88. See ANGELL, supra note 3, at 246.
89. Id. at 245. Dr. Angell nicely summarizes problems with industry sponsored clinical
trials in an article. See generally Angell, supra note 9. For a review of problems with industry
funded trials, see generally Bodenheimer, supra note 11.
90. Wayne A. Ray et al., Evaluating Drugs After Their Approval for Clinical Use, 329 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 2029, 2031 (1993).
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that pharmaceutical-industry-sponsored studies do not answer key questions
about risks and benefits necessary for clinicians to make therapeutic
choices, particularly among alternative drug therapies.91 Nor do drug firms
have incentives to study the cost effectiveness of alternative therapies.92 The
center would fund and/or conduct studies of drugs already approved for
sale and coordinate drug research performed by government agencies.93
Dr. Ray and his colleagues propose to finance the center through a tax on
drug sales and third-party payer subscription fees.94
Dr. Drummond Rennie argues that the United States should create a
National Institute of Clinical Trials, financed with federal funds and a budget
separate from that of the NIH.95 The institute would decide what trials to
conduct and make grants to researchers to carry out the studies.96
Researchers would receive all their funds through their institutions and not
be allowed to receive other funds.97 In a variation of this plan, doctors Lisa
Bero and Rennie have proposed legislation to finance independent studies
of the cost effectiveness and comparative effectiveness of drugs by having
the FDA charge drug firms a user fee.98
A group of scholars interested in public goods and intellectual property
have also called for having publicly funded independent clinical trials.99
They note that in addition to ensuring unbiased evaluation, public funding
would reduce the cost of drug development now borne by individual
firms.100 If clinical trials to test drugs were publicly funded, they argue, it
would be unnecessary to grant drug firms patents or exclusive marketing

91. Id. at 2029-30. The article notes that there were several proposals for Congress to
create a national evaluative body for drugs. Id. at 2031. FDCA amendments proposed in
1974, 1978, and by the Joint Commission on Prescription Drug Use in 1980, and by Senator
David Pryor’s proposed Pharmaceutical Access and Prudent Purchasing Act of 1990. Id.
92. Id. at 2030.
93. Id. at 2031.
94. Id.
95. Rennie, supra note 9, at 1010.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Lisa A. Bero & Drummond Rennie, Influences on the Quality of Published Drug
Studies, 12 INT’L J. TECH. ASSESSMENT HEALTH CARE 209, 229 (1996). Several other physicians
have called for increasing funding for clinical trials to improve pharmaceutical policy and
clinical care. See Tunis et al., supra note 82, at 1631. Dr. A. J. Wood proposed the creation
of an independent drug safety board to evaluate drugs. See Alastair J.J. Wood et al., Making
Medicines Safer – The Need for an Independent Drug Safety Board, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1851, 1852 (1998).
99. E.g.,Tracy R. Lewis et al., The Case for Public Funding and Public Oversight of Clinical
Trials, ECONOMIST’S VOICE, Jan. 2007, at 1 [hereinafter Lewis et al., The Case for Public
Funding], available at http://www.duke.edu/~ab389/PubList/LewisReichmanPDF.pdf.
100. Id. at 1-2.
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periods to spur their investment, or at least we could shorten the duration of
the monopoly.101 Drug prices would fall, which would increase access by
individuals with low income, particularly in third-world countries, and
improve health care globally.102
These reform proposals are supported by scholarly literature and case
studies that document publication bias, biased research design, and other
problems in drug company-controlled trials. Dr. Joel Lexchin and his
colleagues reviewed medical literature on drug-company-sponsored clinical
trials and found that company-sponsored research was more likely to draw
conclusions favorable to the sponsor than studies funded by other
sources.103 Of 16 studies that examine funding sources and outcomes of

101. See James Love & Tim Hubbard, Prizes for Innovation of New Medicines and
Vaccines, 18 ANNALS HEALTH L. 155, 178 (2009); see Tracy R. Lewis et al., Univ. of Cal.
Berkeley Law and Economics Workshop: Treating Clinical Trials as a Public Good: The Most
Logical Reform 4 (Sept. 1, 2006) [hereinafter Lewis et al., Treating Clinical Trials as a Public
Good], available at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/3cn7258n.
102. For discussion of public funding of clinical trials in particular, see Lewis et al., The
Case for Public Funding, supra note 99; Lewis et al., Treating Clinical Trials as a Public Good,
supra note 101; Love & Hubbard, supra note 101, at 159, 177-79. For one of the intellectual
leaders in the public goods approach to intellectual property and drug development, see the
work of James Love, Director of Knowledge Ecology International. James Love, Director,
KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Aug. 12, 2009), http://keionline.org/jamie. For some of his key
articles, see James Love & Tim Hubbard, The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R&D for New
Medicines, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1519, 1528-34 (2007); Tim Hubbard & James Love, A New
Trade Framework for Global R&D, 2 PLOS BIOLOGY 0147, 0150 (2004); Comment from
James Love, Knowledge Ecology Int’l, to the Intergovernmental Working Group on Public
Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property, World Health Organization, The Role of Prizes in
Stimulating R&D (Sept. 30, 2007), available at http://www.who.int/phi/public_hearings/se
cond/contributions_section2/Section2_JamesLove-KEI_prizes.pdf; JAMES LOVE, CONSUMER
PROJECT ON TECH., EVIDENCE REGARDING RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENTS IN
INNOVATIVE AND NON-INNOVATIVE MEDICINES (2003). See generally DEAN BAKER, CTR.. FOR
ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, THE BENEFITS AND SAVINGS FROM PUBLICLY- FUNDED CLINICAL TRIALS
OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS (2008). See generally THOMAS POGGE, AUSTL. NAT’L UNIV., CRAWFORD
SCH. OF PUB. POLICY, DEV. POLICY CTR., DISCUSSION PAPER #7, THE HEALTH IMPACT FUND: MORE
JUSTICE AND EFFICIENCY IN GLOBAL HEALTH (2011). See generally Thomas Pogge, The Health
Impact Fund: Boosting Pharmaceutical Innovation Without Obstructing Free Access, 18
CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 78 (2009). In a similar vein, some authors have suggested
that the data from clinical trials should be a public good, and that we should revise treaties
and laws that confer drug companies data exclusivity from their trials for several years. See
Jerome H. Reichman, Rethinking the Role of Clinical Trial Data in International Intellectual
Property Law: The Case for a Public Goods Approach, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 9
(2009).
103. Joel Lexchin et al., Pharmaceutical Industry Sponsorship and Research Outcome and
Quality: Systematic Review, 326 BRIT. MED. J. 1167, 1167 (2003).
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clinical trials and meta-analyses, 13 studies found that drug-companyfunded studies favored the sponsor’s product.104
Studies may favor the sponsor’s product due to publication bias.105 Drug
firms typically do not seek to publish studies unless it helps market their
product.106 As a result, published literature is a biased sample of the studies
that have been conducted.107 Indeed, sometimes drug firms even try to stop
researchers from independently publishing articles on clinical trials that yield
unfavorable results.108 Pharmaceutical firm funding, furthermore, also skews
what kinds of studies are conducted. Manufacturers, notes Dr. Wayne Ray,
“would not benefit from studies to determine whether inexpensive off-patent
drugs or non-pharmaceutical interventions could replace profitable, singlesource products or from studies to determine the rates of adverse reactions
to approved products.”109
A growing literature also documents various sources of bias in trial
outcomes including the questions posed, the study design, its methodology,
and the way it is conducted or reported.110 Even well-designed studies may
slant results due to flaws in how they were conducted. Researchers might not
follow the protocol, not report all the data, incorrectly report the data, or
fabricate the data.111
The choice of research subjects can also skew outcomes. Individuals
should be randomly assigned among the test and control groups and
neither clinician nor research subject should know in which group they are
placed. However, researchers sometimes use flawed randomization methods

104. Id. at 1168.
105. P.C. Gøtzsche, Multiple Publication of Reports of Drug Trials, 36 EUR. J. CLINICAL
PHARMACOLOGY 429, 431-32 (1989); Patricia Huston & David Moher, Redundancy,
Disaggregation, and the Integrity of Medical Research, 347 LANCET 1024, 1025 (1996);
Martin R. Tramèr et al., Impact of Covert Duplicate Publication on Meta-Analysis: A Case
Study, 315 BRIT. MED. J. 635, 635 (1997).
106. See Bero & Rennie, supra note 98, at 209; see Huston & Moher, supra note 105, at
1025.
107. Tramèr et al., supra note 105, at 638.
108. Michael McCarthy, Company Sought to Block Paper’s Publication, 356 LANCET 1659,
1659 (2000); David G. Nathan & David J. Weatherall, Academic Freedom in Clinical
Research, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1368, 1369 (2002); Drummond Rennie, Editorial, Thyroid
Storm, 277 JAMA 1238, 1238 (1997) (describing Boots Pharmaceuticals’ attempt to discredit
and prevent the publication by claiming the study was flawed).
109. Ray et al., supra note 90, at 2030.
110. Bero & Rennie, supra note 98, at 211; P.C. Waller et al., Review of Company PostMarketing Surveillance Studies, 304 BRIT. MED. J. 1470, 1471 (1992); Peter C. Gøtzsche,
Methodology and Overt and Hidden Bias in Reports of 196 Double-Blind Trials of
Nonsteroidal Antiinflammatory Drugs in Rheumatoid Arthritis, 10 CONTROLLED CLINICAL TRIALS
31, 31-32 (1989).
111. Bero & Rennie, supra note 98, at 219, 222.
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so patients are not actually randomly assigned or either the clinician or
research subject knows whether the individual receives the test drug or the
alternative.112 Also, sometimes drugs are tested on individuals who are not
typical of patients who will use the drug; for example, they may be healthier
than intended patients.113
Often drug studies measure a surrogate endpoint rather than the
desired effect. Rather than testing the extent to which a drug reduces heart
attacks, strokes, or mortality due to coronary artery disease, for example, the
trial measures its effect on the research subject’s cholesterol level.114 The
presumption is that reducing blood cholesterol will decrease cardiac
morbidity and mortality, but that might not actually be so.
Ideally, drug trials should evaluate the drug’s effectiveness, toxicity and
other risks, treatment costs, and its ease of use.115 In fact, they often do not
study all these variables: they measure effectiveness or risk, not both.116
Frequently they do not measure how the drug’s effect varies as the dose
changes, so we do not know the trade-offs between positive benefits and
toxicity as the drug dose increases.117 Furthermore, many trials compare a
drug to a placebo rather than to the standard drug therapy or other
treatments and therefore do not help clinicians decide whether to use one
drug rather than another, or a non-drug therapy.118 And comparative
studies are often flawed because they do not evaluate differences in effect as
the drug dose changes. Studies that compare two drugs with a fixed dose
are often biased because the choice of dose favors one drug over the other,
but the drug’s apparent superiority ends when the dose is changed.119
IV. THE STALLED REFORM: PROPOSALS FOR INDEPENDENT
DRUG TESTING 1960-1980
The question of how to test drugs and who should do the testing
surfaced before Congress enacted the 1962 FDCA Amendments that
empowered the FDA to oversee drug testing used by the firms to support
their application to market new drugs.120 Moreover, debates over how to
test drugs to ensure they are safe and effective persisted even after Congress
112. Id. at 216, 218.
113. Id. at 213.
114. See id. at 219.
115. See Tunis et al., supra note 82, at 1626-27.
116. Bero & Rennie, supra note 98, at 218.
117. See id.
118. Tunis et al., supra note 82, at 1629.
119. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: E 10 CHOICE OF CONTROL
GROUP AND RELATED ISSUES IN CLINICAL TRIALS 7-8 (2001).
120. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 102, 76 Stat. 780, 781 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. (2006)).
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enacted the 1962 FDCA Amendments. A review of United States Senate
hearings and other documents reveals a persistent debate between 1959
and 1980 in Congress, the FDA, and among industry and consumer
representatives over what a drug-testing regime should look like. In hearings
chaired by Senators Estes Kefauver (D-TN), Hubert Humphrey (D-WI),
Gaylord Nelson (D-WI) and Ted Kennedy (D-MA), witnesses proposed and
debated the merits of alternative approaches.121
One problem noted with having drug firms test drugs was that the
economic incentives of drug firms compromised their impartiality, biased the
design of clinical trials, and sometimes led to fraud.122 A second problem
noted was that testing laboratories and physician investigators performed
shoddy work because of their lack of training and their desire to boost
income by cutting corners.123 In order to resolve these problems, many
observers suggested that Congress should enact legislation to prevent drug

121. Administered Prices in the Drug Industry (Antibiotics), Part 24: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. On Antitrust and Monopoly of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong. (1960)
[hereinafter Administered Prices Hearing, Part 24]; Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the
Pharmaceutical Industry, 1975, Part 1: Joint Hearings before the Subcomm. on Health of the S.
Comm. On Labor and Public Welfare and the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and
Procedure of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. (1975) [hereinafter Preclinical and
Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 1]; Interagency Coordination in Drug Research and Regulation:
Agency Coordination Study, Part 3: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Reorganization and Int’l
Org. of the S. Comm. on Government Operations, 88th Cong. (1963) [hereinafter Drug
Research and Regulation Hearings, Part 3]; Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry, Parts 134: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly of the S. Select Comm. on Small Bus., 9096th Cong. (1967-79) [hereinafter Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry Hearings, Parts
1-34].
122. The FDA had noted problems with fraud, bias, and poor study design even before
1961. See Interagency Coordination in Drug Research and Regulation: Agency Coordination
Study, Part 1: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Reorganization and Int’l Org. of the S.
Comm. on Government Operations, 87th Cong. 32 (1962) [hereinafter Drug Research and
Regulation Hearings, Part 1] (statement of William S. Middleton, Chief Medical Director,
Veterans’ Administration). See Interagency Coordination in Drug Research and Regulation:
Agency Coordination Study, Part 2: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Reorganization and Int’l
Org. of the S. Comm. on Government Operations, 87th Cong. 373, 375 (1962) [hereinafter
Drug Research and Regulation Hearings, Part 2] (statement of Mr. William Weiss, Bureau of
Program Planning and Appraisal, Food and Drug Administration).
123. These problems were analyzed by several people. See MORTON MINTZ, THE
THERAPEUTIC NIGHTMARE: A REPORT ON THE ROLES OF THE UNITED STATES FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION, THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS, AND
OTHERS IN CONNECTION WITH THE IRRATIONAL AND MASSIVE USE OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS THAT
MAY BE WORTHLESS, INJURIOUS, OR EVEN LETHAL (1965), reprinted in MORTON MINTZ, BY
PRESCRIPTION ONLY 331-34 (1967); see JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATE CRIME IN THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 105 (1984); see MILTON SILVERMAN & PHILIP R. LEE, PILLS, PROFITS,
AND POLITICS 137 (1974).
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firms from controlling the evaluation of drugs.124 They argued that in order
to ensure the integrity and quality of testing, the federal government should
either perform the testing itself, or contract with independent parties to
design and carry out the clinical trials.125
By 1960, the FDA found that many applications for drug approval were
based on poorly designed and implemented studies.126 FDA investigations
and congressional hearings revealed fraud by testing laboratories, physician
investigators, and drug firms, as well as quality problems that compromised
the reliability of results.127 Between 1960 and 1980, the FDA developed
regulations to address these problems.128 The standards for drug testing
became more rigorous and FDA oversight increased, but congressional
hearings revealed that many problems still persisted.129
A.

1960-1961: The Kefauver Hearings and Other Proposals for
Independent Testing

Senator Estes Kefauver held hearings on the pharmaceutical industry
from 1959 to 1961. The hearing initially focused on market competition,
but after the Thalidomide disaster they focused on drug safety issues,
including drug testing.130 At those hearings Dr. Maxwell Finland, who was
associate director of the Thorndike Memorial Laboratory, associate
professor of medicine at Harvard Medical School, and a physician at the
Boston City Hospital, testified in support of creating a system of independent
drug testing.131 The federal government, he noted, had generously funded
basic scientific and medical research but had neglected applied research,

124. See Administered Prices Hearing, Part 24, supra note 121, at 13,933 (statement of
Maxwell Finland, Associate Professor of Medicine, Harvard Medical School).
125. Id. at 13,932-33; BRAITHWAITE, supra note 123, at 104.
126. See Drug Research and Regulation Hearings, Part 3, supra note 121, at 782.
127. Id. at 792; See Drug Research and Regulation Hearings, Part 2, supra note 122, at
375.
128. Significant Dates in U.S. Food and Drug Law History, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
(Nov. 6, 2012), http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Milestones/ucm1283
05.htm.
129. Preclinical and Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 1, supra note 121, at 8-9.
130. Administered Prices Hearing, Part 24, supra note 121, at 13,609, 13,943, 14,017,
14,041. The hearings and recommendations were summarized in ADMINISTERED PRICES:
DRUGS, S. REP. NO. 87-448 (1961). For an engaging popular account of the hearings on the
pharmaceutical industry chaired by Senator Estes Kefauver, see RICHARD HARRIS, THE REAL
VOICE (1964).
131. Administered Prices Hearing, Part 24, supra note 121, at 13,923. Dr. Finland
discusses this proposal and other issues in an article that appeared while Senators Gaylord
Nelson and Ted Kennedy were investigating the pharmaceutical industry. See Maxwell
Finland, Editorial, Clinical Investigation of New Antimicrobial Agents, 120 J. INFECTIOUS
DISEASES 620, 629 (1969).
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particularly the clinical evaluation of new drugs.132 Dr. Finland recounted his
previous efforts
to interest the National Research Council and also the drug industry to set
up subcommittees or panels in different medical areas for the independent
evaluation of drugs, supported from funds provided either by the
pharmaceutical industry as a whole, or by governmental or other nonprofit
agencies but not tied to individual products or firms.133

Now Dr. Finland suggested an alternative: having the NIH set up study
sections to evaluate drugs.134 With independent testing he argued, “the
endorsement of inferior products that are not in the best interest of the
public, is much less likely to occur than when the support for testing the
product is furnished by the individual producer.”135 Dr. Finland noted that it
would require legislation or regulation “in order to get the products tested in
this unbiased manner before approval, licensing or certification.”136 In
response, Senator Kefauver said that his legislation included “a suggestion
that the efficacy of drugs should also be tested by the Food and Drug
Administration.”137 Dr. Finland replied that it would be preferable for the
evaluation to be carried out by an independent entity rather than FDA
scientists, who would later have to evaluate the results of the research.138
Dr. Finland also specified problems arising from financial dependency
of university researchers on grants from drug firms. He said, “. . .
departments of clinical pharmacology — should not depend on their
continuing work . . . on funds that come from individual drugs, because it is
obvious that some people cannot perhaps divorce their judgment from the
sources of their support.”139
In 1960, Alek Rozental, an economics professor at Saint Louis
University, published his article, The Strange Ethics of the Ethical
Pharmaceutical Industry, in Harper’s Magazine.140 Rozental explained that to
ensure drug safety, the United States should follow the 1959 proposal of the
Hinchliffe Committee, a blue ribbon advisory committee in the United
Kingdom that studied drug safety and cost.141 The Hinchliffe proposal
recommended that “all new drugs. . . . be subject to independent clinical
132. Administered Prices Hearing, Part 24, supra note 121, at 13,932.
133. Id. See generally Finland, supra note 131.
134. Administered Prices Hearing, Part 24, supra note 121, at 13,933.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 13,934.
138. Id.
139. Administered Prices Hearing, Part 24, supra note 121, at 13,934.
140. Alek A. Rozental, The Strange Ethics of the Ethical Drug Industry, HARPER’S MAG., May
1960, at 73.
141. Id. at 82, 84.
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trials preferably conducted by a central organization, to be financed by the
industry."142 Rozental contended that new drugs should be tested to
determine if they are safe and effective, and to compare their performance
and price to existing alternative drugs.143 He acknowledged that political
constraints might preclude the United States from adopting a centralized
testing agency, but suggested that there would be less opposition to
something similar: the creation of an independent profession of clinical
testers akin to certified public accountants serving as independent
auditors.144
B.

1962-1963: The Humphrey Hearings

Senator Hubert Humphrey chaired hearings before the Subcommittee on
Reorganization and International Organizations from August 1962 through
1964.145 His hearings began after the Kefauver hearings (1959-1961), but
before Congress passed the 1962 FDA amendments.146 The committee
examined three important questions: (1) What role should the federal
government play in testing drugs or setting standards for drug testing? (2)
Which organizations should conduct clinical tests? (3) What qualifications
should individuals have to conduct clinical trials?147
When the Humphrey hearings began, the FDA had not yet developed
regulations specifying how drugs should be tested, or what evidence would
be necessary to demonstrate safety and efficacy under the 1962 FDA
amendments.148 The 1938 Food and Drug Act included guidelines for
designing and conducting tests on humans. It provided that manufacturers
had to select reliable investigators with appropriate experience to test drugs,
in particular, “experts qualified by scientific training.”149 But the FDA
142. Id. at 84.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Drug Research and Regulation Hearings, Part 1, supra note 122; Drug Research and
Regulation Hearings, Part 2, supra note 122; Drug Research and Regulation Hearings, Part 3,
supra note 121; Drug Research and Regulation Hearings, Part 4, supra note 26; Interagency
Coordination in Drug Research and Regulation: Agency Coordination Study, Part 5: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. On Reorganization and Int’l Org. of the S. Comm. on Government
Operations, 88th Cong. (1963) [hereinafter Drug Research and Regulation Hearings, Part 5].
146. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780.
147. Drug Research and Regulation Hearings, Part 1, supra note 122, at 2, 58.
148. The FDA promulgated regulations setting standards for conducting clinical trials in
1970. Hearing Requests on Refusal or Withdrawal of New Drug Applications and Issuance,
Amendment or Repeal of Antibiotic Drug Regulations and Describing Scientific Content of
Adequate and Well-Controlled Clinical Investigations, 35 Fed. Reg. 3073, 3073-74 (Feb. 17,
1970) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 146 (1970)).
149. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, § 505, 52 Stat. 1040,
1053 (1938).
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declined to specify criteria that qualified individuals as experts, explaining
that it was not authorized to control the practice of medicine.150
Prior to the 1970 regulations that implemented the 1962 amendments,
there was little distinction between physicians and investigators. Drug firms
would frequently give investigational drugs to a number of practitioners to
test on their patients.151 Pharmaceutical firms would draw on the reports or
testimonials of these physician investigators as evidence of safety when
submitting NDAs.152 The FDA recommended that drugs be tested by
specialists in the diseases for which that drug would be used.153 It
recommended that firms employ several investigators, each working
independently in different locations, to ensure a more balanced assessment
of the drugs' effects.154
However, drug testing was not always clearly separated from marketing.
In 1960, Dr. Mendel C. Sheps from the University of Pittsburgh School of
Medicine wrote, “although some . . . studies are of high quality, the
scientific requirements for careful investigation . . . compete with highpressure marketing demands.”155 In fact, he continued, “the responsibility
for arranging with physicians to make the first trials on human beings is at
times given to detail men.”156
At the 1963 hearings, Senator Karl Mundt (R-SD) asked FDA
Commissioner George P. Larrick to clarify who determined whether
investigators were experts.157 He asked, “Expertise is determined by the firm
trying to sell the goods, rather than by the organization trying to protect the
public health; is that right?”158 Larrick explained that although the FDA
lacked a legal standard for expertise in testing drugs, it took investigators'
backgrounds into account when assessing NDAs.159 It checked “whether or
not this man who did the work [has] . . . scientific experience, education and
whatnot . . . [that are] qualifications to do that job.”160 Draft regulations,
Larrick noted, allowed the FDA to require companies to submit information

150. New York Academy of Medicine, Committee on Public Health, The Importance of
Clinical Testing in Determining the Efficacy and Safety of Drugs, 38 BULL. N.Y. ACAD. MED.
415, 420 (1962).
151. See id.
152. See id. at 419.
153. Id. at 420.
154. Id.
155. Drug Research and Regulation Hearings, Part 4, supra note 26, at 1589-90.
156. Id. at 1590.
157. Drug Research and Regulation Hearings, Part 1, supra note 122, at 40.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 200.
160. Id. at 195-96.
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on the professional qualifications of proposed investigators, along with their
plans for testing.161
The hearing record included a 1962 report on the clinical testing of
drugs by the New York Academy of Medicine, which found that many tests
were substandard due to the shortcomings of the investigators who lacked
training or experience in designing studies, or recording and reporting
results.162 The New York Academy recommended that investigators should
have training in clinical research, that pharmaceutical firms' medical
directors should have experience in clinical testing, and that investigations
should take place in hospitals.163 The report also noted that the FDA had
refrained from issuing standards for clinical investigators because it did not
want to interfere with the practice of medicine and that no other official or
professional body had undertaken this task.164
Regarding the respective roles of the federal government and the
pharmaceutical industry, Dr. Burroughs Mider, Director of Laboratories and
Clinics at the NIH, explained to Senator Karl Mundt that his understanding
was that drug manufacturers bore primary responsibility for the research that
supported drug development and licensing.165 Senator Mundt responded
that this arrangement, “. . . is not quite adequate to serve the public
interest.”166
At the time, the FDA could not conduct any of its own clinical tests.167
Paul L. Day, then the Scientific Director of FDA’s scientific program, reported
that the FDA needed to engage in more basic research, noting that without
it, the agency’s emphasis on dealing with short-term regulatory problems
would leave it ill-prepared for future developments.168 Mr. Day said, “We
are so busy putting out fires that we don’t have time to do any fire
prevention.”169 The lack of a substantial FDA scientific program not only

161. Id. at 197-98.
162. Drug Research and Regulation Hearings, Part 2, supra note 122, at 528-41.
163. Id. at 531, 539-40.
164. Id. at 531. Note that professional organizations did ultimately consider establishing
their own guidelines. The American Society for Pharmacology and Experimental Therapeutics,
for example, considered the question of whether qualifying boards should be established in
clinical pharmacology. Drug Research and Regulation Hearings, Part 4, supra note 26, at
1607. However, concluding that a certification system for scientists’ conduction research had
“no acceptable precedent,” it decided against it. Id.
165. Drug Research and Regulation Hearings, Part 1, supra note 122, at 215.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 175 (article by Ralph G. Smith, Director, Division of New Drugs, Food and
Drug Administration).
168. Drug Research and Regulation Hearings, Part 2, supra note 122, at 325-26.
169. Id. at 325; see also id. at 342 (report based on a 1960 survey of employee attitudes
at FDA concluded that the agency should be “strongly supported in its effort to maintain a
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corroded employee morale and retention, but also weakened the FDA,
which needed qualified scientists to review NDAs, which were often flawed
due to poor study design, bias, and sometimes even fraud.170
The 1962 hearings examined the federal government’s intramural
clinical research programs. William Middleton, Chief Medical Director of
the Veterans’ Administration (VA) Department of Medicine and Surgery,
informed the Committee that the VA had been conducting limited clinical
trials in its facilities since 1947, beginning with tuberculosis drugs.171 In all,
the VA had conducted 29 “cooperative studies” (clinical investigations).172
Dr. Burroughs Mider reported on the intramural testing capacity of the NIH,
including facilities for the study of approximately 420 patients, most of
whom suffered from diseases with no known cures.173
The New York Academy of Medicine report outlined but rejected two
reform proposals that would have shifted responsibility from drug firms to
the federal government. The first proposal was to establish a “national
central office on testing . . . [that would] arrange to conduct and supervise
the testing of all products.”174 The report argued that a national center
would be overly bureaucratic, and would be unacceptable to
pharmaceutical manufacturers and clinicians.175 The second proposal,
modeled on the AMA Committee on Therapeutic Trials, would establish a
national referral agency for clinical investigators.176 The report found that
the idea had merit, but ultimately did not support it due to the failure of the
AMA’s earlier plan.177
In 1963, Consumers Union, which had built its reputation as an
independent tester of consumer products, and had long advocated for the
enactment of food and drug safety legislation, evaluated the 1962 FDA
amendments in its journal, Consumer Reports.178 “At the core of the
problem” of drug safety, it said, “lies that most fundamental question:

research program of high quality on methodology and standardization of drug testing and
related areas of science.”).
170. Id. at 375 (statement of Shelbey T. Grey, Director, Bureau of Program Planning and
Appraisal, Food and Drug Administration).
171. Drug Research and Regulation Hearings, Part 1, supra note 122, at 32-33.
172. Id. at 33.
173. Id. at 213-14.
174. Drug Research and Regulation Hearings, Part 2, supra note 122, at 538.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Drug Safety: The Basic Question is Whether Control of Clinical Testing Should Be Left
to Manufacturers. At a Time of Worldwide Concern over Dangerous Drugs, a “Citizen’s
Committee” Proposes Surrender of Public Responsibility, CONSUMER REP., Mar. 1963, at 134
[hereinafter CONSUMER REPORTS].
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namely, is it good public policy to permit the drug manufacturers to do or to
supervise the clinical testing of their own products?”179
The article acknowledged that the 1962 amendments authorized the
FDA to oversee drug testing, but noted, “the drug maker remains
responsible for drug testing.”180 It argued that since the FDA was handling
test reports that have been “procured by the manufacturers,” the
arrangement was an inadequate substitute for “an objective testing
agency.”181 The article supported Senator Hubert Humphrey’s call for
having the World Health Organization (WHO) oversee a network of drug
evaluation centers.182 In Senate testimony, Consumers Union called for the
creation of an independent government agency to test drugs that would
produce all of the data that the FDA would use in deciding whether to
approve marketing for drugs.183 It envisioned this agency as a public-private
partnership.184 There would be no parallel testing by drug firms.185
Dr. Charles May, professor of pediatrics at New York University School
of Medicine, called for increasing the amount of clinical testing conducted
by publicly funded researchers in universities and at the FDA. He proposed
the creation of publicly funded, autonomous drug testing centers located at
medical-school-affiliated hospitals.186 The facilities and core staff would be
publicly funded.187 The FDA or other agencies would provide grants for
individual research projects.188 Investigators would choose research projects
based on scientific merit.189
In correspondence with the Congressional Committee, several other
physicians suggested that there should be a separation between firms
sponsoring an application to approve a new drug and researchers testing

179. CONSUMER REPORTS, supra note 178, at 136.
180. Id.
181. Drug Research and Regulation Hearings, Part 3, supra note 121, at 1051-52.
182. Id. at 1052.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See id.
186. Dr. May summarized his ideas in a March 1963 memorandum and subsequent
hearing testimony. Drug Research and Regulation Hearings, Part 3, supra note 121, at 104246, 1053-54.
187. Id. at 1054.
188. See id. Note how this differs from the current system for NIH research grants. Rather
than directly subsidizing facilities and staff at dedicated facilities, NIH grants support these
costs through an indirect cost ratio built into grant awards. See Circular A-21, Cost Principles
for Educational Institutions, THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET (May 10, 2004),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a021_2004.
189. Drug Research and Regulation Hearings, Part 3, supra note 121, at 1054.
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the drug.190 One idea was to have the industry pool research funds. In
September 1962, Dr. Keith J.B. Wightman of the University of Toronto
proposed that pharmaceutical manufacturers create and collectively fund a
foundation that would help design studies, identify investigators and
facilities, and publish the results.191 In April 1964, the president of the
American Society for Clinical Investigation supported a proposal to replace
the practice of having individual drug firms directly pay investigators.192 The
proposal suggested instead that a board of impartial scientists, and public
and industry representatives, should disburse payments to drug testers from
a common fund supported by pharmaceutical firms.193
More frequently, physicians suggested placing even greater distance
between drug manufacturers and those who conducted clinical trials. In
December 1963, Dr. George Baehr, Chair of the New York State Public
Health Council, proposed conducting drug testing only in FDA-approved
trial centers located in teaching hospitals.194 Dr. M.F. Murnaghan of the
University of Ottawa explained that when the FDA was unsatisfied with
manufacturer testing, it “either will have to set up facilities to check such
testing or have the tests repeated by a neutral body at the expense of the
manufacturer.”195 In January 1964, Dr. M. Harold Book of Kings Park State
Hospital wrote, “the preliminary testing on human patients . . . should be
assigned to some independent noncommercial agency and not to any
individuals or groups who are dependent in any way for financial support on
pharmaceutical houses . . . .”196 He suggested several options. “It might be
a . . . branch of the Food and Drug Administration . . . a panel of experts
chosen from universities and research institutions . . . the United Nations or
possibly a new agency . . . .”197 In March 1964, Drs. I.H. Page and Ray W.
Gifford, Jr. of the Cleveland Clinic concurred, stating, “We have repeatedly
suggested that an independent agency be created to receive and administer
funds to pay the cost of drug testing. . . .”198
During this period, there were increasing reports of fraud in
pharmaceutical firm — sponsored testing. In 1962, reports of harmful side
effects from the use of MER/29 (triparanol), a drug marketed to reduce
190. Drug Research and Regulation Hearings, Part 4, supra note 26, at 1617-41 (Exhibit
205, Clinical Testing: Letters to Subcomm. on Safety & Efficacy).
191. Id. at 1600.
192. Drug Research and Regulation Hearings, Part 5, supra note 145, at 2419-20
(statement of Irving M. London, President, American Society for Clinical Investigation).
193. Id.
194. Drug Research and Regulation Hearings, Part 4, supra note 26, at 1641.
195. Drug Research and Regulation Hearings, Part 5, supra note 145, at 2284.
196. Id. at 2285.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 2296.
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blood cholesterol, led the manufacturer, William S. Merrell, a subsidiary of
Richardson-Merrell, to stop selling the drug.199 Subsequent investigations
found widespread fraud in the reporting of their toxicological studies.200
Merrell’s director of biological sciences not only substituted healthy animals
for ones that had been tested with the drug and became sick, but also
falsified data on the dosages of the drug that animals had received, and
their responses.201
An FDA investigation revealed that Dr. Kathleen E. Roberts had
fabricated at least 57 charts, which purported to indicate how patients
responded to the drug Regimen, prescribed to help reduce weight.202
Another investigation in 1964 revealed that Dr. Bennett A. Robin submitted
fraudulent clinical data.203 Robin was considered a reputable researcher
and had been involved in the testing of 45 different drugs.204
There were also reports of bias arising from drug company sponsorships
of drug trials. The trade press reported on “rigging” of research.205 A 1963
editorial in the New England Journal of Medicine criticized firms that set
unethical publication conditions, specifically, permitting publication only if
the research produced positive results.206
In the 1964 hearing record, Senator Hubert H. Humphrey included the
views of professionals about how drug firms' payments to clinical
investigators might affect the investigators' objectivity. Dr. Edward Adelson,
of the George Washington University School of Medicine, wrote
a drug manufacturer who is anxious to obtain data to support the value of
one of his drugs will be tempted to choose investigators who are more likely
to give him the data he wants. Therefore, an investigator who depends on
drug funds for his income knows that if he hopes to get further grants it
would be better to obtain results proving the drug he is testing is a good
one.207

Dr. George E. Schreiner, of Georgetown University Hospital and head of the
American Federation for Clinical Research, indicated, “that when there is

199. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 123, at 60.
200. Id. at 61-64.
201. Id. at 61-62.
202. Id. at 57.
203. Id. at 58.
204. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 123, at 58.
205. Drug Research and Regulation Hearings, Part 3, supra note 121, at 975-76 (Exhibit
137, Excerpt From Drug Trade News).
206. Id. at 1018 (Exhibit 143, Editorial from the New England Journal of Medicine, March
21, 1963).
207. Drug Research and Regulation Hearings, Part 4, supra note 26, at 1647.
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direct payment from drug firms, there may be too much temptation to turn in
a favorable report . . . .”208
In a memo to his committee colleagues at the conclusion of the 1964
hearings, Senator Humphrey framed key questions that the Congress faced:
Should the auspices for present testing be changed or, more likely,
supplemented? Should, as some sources contend, the pharmaceutical
industry be asked by the profession to contribute to a “central pool” of funds
to be administered by the profession and from which private laboratories
and clinics, entirely independent of industry, could perform preclinical and
clinical tests? Should the Food and Drug Administration be given the funds
for a comprehensive supplementary testing program? . . . Among the
relatively few expert observers who have submitted proposals is . . . Dr.
[Harry] Dowling. In 1961, he wrote: “as an aid to the clinical testing of
drugs, the [FDA] should have funds at its disposal to finance the testing of a
drug by an independent agency (which would usually be a medical school
or hospital) in cases in which the Administration was not satisfied with the
evidence submitted by the manufacturer of the drug.”209

The implementations of the 1962 FDA amendments did not put an end
to poor quality clinical trials or fraud. Speaking before the Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association in 1966, FDA Commissioner James L. Goddard
said
I have been shocked at the materials that come in. In addition to the
problem of quality, there is the problem of dishonesty in the investigational
new drug stage[,] [including] . . . t h e c o n s c i o u s w i t h h o l d i n g o f
unfavorable animal clinical data[,] [and] . . . [t]he deliberate choice of
clinical investigators known to be more concerned about industry
friendships than in developing good data . . .210

A 1966 FDA investigation found that Dr. Leo J. Cass, a physician
employed by the Harvard Law School Health Service, who had helped
evaluate over 84 investigational drugs, had reported data on patients who
had never been treated with the drug. 211 These kind of problems continued
throughout the late 1960s.

208. Drug Research and Regulation Hearings, Part 5, supra note 145, at 2406 (Exhibit
273, Article by Joseph R. Hixson, Herald Tribune).
209. Drug Research and Regulation Hearings, Part 4, supra note 26, at 1688 (Exhibit 210).
210. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 123, at 51; Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the
Pharmaceutical Industry, 1976, Part 2: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health of the S.
Comm. On Labor and Public Welfare and the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and
Procedure of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 157 (1976) [hereinafter Preclinical
and Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2] (statement of Sen. Gaylord Nelson, Subcomm. on
Health of the S. Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare).
211. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 123, at 58-59.
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During this period, FDA officials met with industry officials and
specialists on research methodology and drug trials to develop more
rigorous drug testing procedures.212 These efforts culminated in the FDA
sponsoring a conference on drug testing after which the FDA promulgated
regulations on the evidence that the FDA would require to demonstrate drug
safety and efficacy.213
C. 1967-1979: The Nelson Proposal and Hearings
Senator Gaylord Nelson chaired congressional hearings on Competitive
Problems in the Pharmaceutical Industry from 1967 to 1979.214 The
committee investigated clinical trials and other matters.215 It heard testimony
from individuals proposing reforms that spanned a continuum from modest
changes in current arrangements, to shifting the responsibility for testing
drugs' safety and efficacy from drug firms to the federal government.216
Other witnesses made proposals between these two poles. These included
proposals to have an independent agency contract with independent third
parties to perform the research.217
During the 1968-69 hearings, several physicians advocated on behalf
of requiring independent drug testing. Dr. Paul Lowinger, Associate
Professor of Psychiatry at Wayne State University School of Medicine and
Chief of Outpatient Services at the Lafayette Clinic in Detroit, Michigan,
proposed the creation of a federal agency, separate from the FDA, funded
212. Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry: Present Status of Competition in the
Pharmaceutical Industry, Part 22: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly of the S. Select
Comm. on Small Bus., 92nd Cong. 8527 (1972) [hereinafter Competitive Problems in the
Drug Industry Hearings, Part 22] (statement of Charles C. Edwards, Comm’r, Food and Drug
Administration).
213. See id. Hearing Requests on Refusal or Withdrawal of New Drug Applications and
Issuance, Amendment or Repeal of Antibiotic Drug Regulations and Describing Scientific
Content of Adequate and Well-Controlled Clinical Investigations, 35 Fed. Reg. 3073, 307374 (Feb. 17, 1970) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 146 (1970)).
214. See generally Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry Hearings, Parts 1-34, supra
note 121. These hearings, held from 1967 to 1979, are nicely summarized by two reports of
the Congressional Research Services. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., COMPETITIVE PROBLEMS IN THE
DRUG INDUSTRY: DRUG TESTING, SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS (1979) [hereinafter CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., 1979 SUMMARY] (providing “a summary analysis and discussion of the issues highlighted
during the 1968 and 1969 hearings on drug testing with a review of more recent findings and
government actions relating to FDA testing requirements”); CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
COMPETITIVE PROBLEMS IN THE DRUG INDUSTRY: DRUG TESTING, SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS (1972).
215. See generally Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry Hearings, Parts 1-34, supra
note 121 (discussing issues related to clinical trials and other issues in the pharmaceutical
industry).
216. See generally id. (testimony from various individuals in the industry proposing drug
testing reform).
217. See id.
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by the federal government and/or the pharmaceutical industry, to supervise
drug research.218 The agency would test drugs, finance independent
organizations to test drugs, or oversee drug trials.219 Investigators would
report their findings to the agency, instead of the drug sponsor.220 Dr. Dale
Console, former medical director of E. R. Squibb & Co., supported the idea
of creating a central testing agency that would select investigators to
conduct drug trials, without the drug sponsors knowing their identity.221 He
suggested that the agency be supported by the federal government, and that
fees be paid by drug firms.222
In contrast, Dr. Franz Inglefinger, editor of the New England Journal of
Medicine, testified that independent testing, overseen by a government
agency, would reduce the risk of bias, but might not be worth the cost.223
He thought it was probably sufficient to require drug firms to contract with
universities to perform clinical trials.224 Universities, he said, could assume
responsibility for the trustworthiness of the clinical research.225 He argued
that if drug firms paid universities, rather than directly paying clinical
researchers, improper financial influence upon investigators would be
eliminated.226 If Congress chose to have an independent organization
oversee these drug trials used to support applications to market drugs, Dr.
Inglefinger suggested that the medical profession, the pharmaceutical
industry, and the federal government should jointly manage the
organization.227
Dr. Donald Mainland, who coordinated research for the American
Rheumatism Association’s Cooperating Clinics Committee, testified that it
was current practice for the drug firm seeking marketing approval to act as

218. Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry: Present Status of Competition in the
Pharmaceutical Industry, Part 10: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly of the S. Select
Comm. on Small Bus., 90th-91st Cong. 3997, 4001 (1969) [hereinafter Competitive
Problems in the Drug Industry Hearings, Part 10].
219. Id. at 4001-02.
220. Id. at 4002; CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 1979 SUMMARY, supra note 214, at 68-69.
221. Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry: Present Status of Competition in the
Pharmaceutical Industry, Part 11: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly of the S. Select
Comm. on Small Bus., 91st Cong. 4481 (1969) [hereinafter Competitive Problems in the Drug
Industry Hearings, Part 11].
222. Id.
223. Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry Hearings, Part 10, supra note 218, at
4017, 4024-25.
224. Id. at 4025.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 4019.
227. Id. at 4024.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

144

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY

[Vol. 6:113

an intermediary between the FDA staff and third-party testers.228 This
arrangement allowed drug firms to influence the trials as well as the
communication between testers and the FDA. Dr. Mainland suggested that
Congress, “take the evaluation of drugs entirely out of the producer's
hands,” after the completion of toxicological testing on animals, in order to
remove the possibility of the producer biasing the process.229 Dr. Mainland
proposed the creation of an independent, not-for-profit drug-testing agency
that would provide grants for research in a manner roughly analogous to
the NIH.230 He suggested that a council of experts from universities and
research institutions should invite senior investigators to form “working
parties” for individual drugs.231 These “working parties” would then choose
teams of suitable investigators to conduct the safety and efficacy studies.232
The agency should be funded largely by the pharmaceutical industry in a
manner that did not allow it to “influence the disposal of the money or
interfere in any way with the trials or the results.”233
Dr. Paul Lowinger, of Wayne State University School of Medicine,
proposed that Congress should create a National Institute of Pharmacology,
“to supervis[e] and approv[e] research protocols for [drug]
investigations . . .” and require drug firms to shoulder the financial
responsibility for clinical trials.234 Under his proposal, investigators would
report their results to both the institute and the firm sponsoring the drug.235
Dr. George Nichols, of Harvard Medical School, proposed the creation of a
central agency to test drugs, jointly financed by drug firms and the federal
government.236 He said that this arrangement would eliminate,
“questionable practices revolving around payment to investigators . . . .”237
Dr. William B. Bean, head of internal medicine at the University of Iowa
College of Medicine, testified that third-party testing was not a new idea.238
He explained that the AMA had tried to operate an independent testing

228. Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry: Present Status of Competition in the
Pharmaceutical Industry, Part 7: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopoly of the S. Select
Comm. on Small Bus., 90th Cong. 2775, 2777 (1968) [hereinafter Competitive Problems in
the Drug Industry Hearings, Part 7].
229. Id.
230. Id. at 2768.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry Hearings, Part 7, supra note 228, at 2769.
234. Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry Hearings, Part 10, supra note 218, at
4002.
235. Id. at 4002-03.
236. Id. at 3985.
237. Id.
238. See id. at 3916-21.
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system, but had given up because they found it was “far too extensive and
expensive.”239 Dr. Bean supported having drug testing conducted by, “a
neutral judging body professionally competent, and quite independent of
any extraneous force of financial support or any hint of obligation or
connection with the . . . promoters of the drug.”240 He favored having
medical schools and departments of clinical pharmacology perform drug
testing, supervised by a central drug panel.241 In questioning Dr. Bean about
his proposal, Senator Nelson suggested that one option to organize the
trials would be to place independent groups in control of the process, while
charging drug companies the costs.242 Dr. Bean concurred that in his view,
this was “the proper direction” for reforms.243
In 1968, the director of the NIH, Dr. James Shannon, called for having
the NIH or another federal agency help evaluate drugs. When data that the
FDA received from studies by manufacturers were insufficient or were
questioned, the agency would conduct its own studies or contract with
independent institutions to conduct studies. Dr. Harry Dowling, a leading
authority on drug safety responded by suggesting it might be better for the
FDA to develop in house capacity to evaluate drugs.244
In 1971, Senator Nelson introduced legislation to create a system of
independent third-party drug testing as part of an omnibus drug bill. He
summarized the problem the bill sought to remedy as follows.245
239. Competitive Problems in the Drug Industry Hearings, Part 10, supra note 218, at
3920.
240. Id. at 3919.
241. Id. at 3920.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. See DOWLING, supra note 28, at 230-32 (commenting on the Shannon proposal
published in NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, DRUG RESEARCH REPORTS 4 (1968)).
245. The bill was included as part of an omnibus drug bill, S. 2812, in the 92nd Congress.
It was introduced as stand-alone legislation thereafter. Public Health Price Protection Act of
1972, S. 966, 93d Cong. (1973) (a bill “[t]o amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act, as amended, to provide for the establishment of a national drug testing and evaluation
center); National Drug Testing and Evaluation Act, S. 1321, 94th Congress (1975); National
Drug Testing and Evaluation Act, S. 630, 95th Congress (1977); National Drug Testing and
Evaluation Act of 1979, S.774, 96th Congress (1979). Senator Nelson testified that he
developed his proposal with FDA officials in 1969 while chairing the “Competitive Problems”
hearings. See Preclinical and Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 210, at 157. In
addition to creating a system for independent drug testing S. 2812 would require that “in
order for a new drug to be approved, it must be demonstrated that the new drug is safer or
more effective than a drug already on the market. 117 CONG. REC. 39,204-09 (1971)
(statement of Sen. Gaylord Nelson). For exposition and discussion of Nelson’s third-party
testing proposal as described in S. 966, see the hearings chaired by Senator Ted Kennedy,
Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1973-74: Legislation Amending the Public Health
Service Act and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Parts 1, 5, 6, 7: Hearings on S.
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As the law reads at present, the FDA determines the safety and efficacy of a
drug solely on the basis of information supplied by the drug company
making the application. The dangers involved in the dependence on drug
firms to perform, direct, or arrange for the testing of drugs in which they
have a financial interest is obvious . . . . [T]here is an inevitable tendency—
no matter how conscientious the firm—to emphasize the positive features
and deemphasize the negative. Many of the people they engage to do their
testing are equally anxious to secure additional contracts for drug testing…
A physician who turns in unfavorable reports on the drugs he is testing may
not have his contract renewed . . . . [S]ome firms have been guilty of
misrepresenting, distorting, and even withholding information developed in
their testing of drugs which might in any way retard or prevent an approval
to market. Injury and death have resulted from such actions.
Testing of drugs should be done by specialists who have no direct
relationship with the manufacturer, who cannot benefit financially from the
results, who are not motivated even subconsciously by the desire to get
anything but the truth. We must remove the responsibility for testing drugs
from the applicant who has a financial interest in the drug.246

As he explained several years later, the current system is, “inherently
defective in that the promoter and beneficiary of the product which needs to
be licensed and marketed controls all the studies that are made to prove its
safety and its efficacy.”247 Senator Nelson introduced the omnibus drug bill
again in 1973, and sponsored stand-alone bills for independent drug
testing in each Congress until he lost his re-election bid in 1980.248
Under Nelson’s proposed legislation, the federal government would be
responsible for all testing for NDAs and reviews of drugs.249 The federal
government would either perform the tests, or contract with independent
organizations to perform them.250 The legislation authorized the creation of
3441 and S. 966 Before the Subcomm. On Health of the S. Comm. on Labor and the Public
Welfare, 93d-94th Cong. (1973-74). See also Senator Nelson’s statement before the
Kennedy subcommittee in which he outlines more than a decade of statements by the FDA
indicating the problems of fraud and poorly designed studies were a problem of the past and
that stronger monitoring and inspections have eliminated the problem. Preclinical and Clinical
Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 210, at 156-60.
246. 117 CONG. REC. 39,204-09 (1971).
247. Preclinical and Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 210, at 156.
248. Public Health Price Protection Act of 1972, S. 966, 93d Cong. (1973); National
Drug Testing and Evaluation Act, S. 1321, 94th Congress (1975); National Drug Testing and
Evaluation Act, S. 630, 95th Congress (1977); National Drug Testing and Evaluation Act of
1979, S.774, 96th Congress (1979).
249. Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1973-74, Part 1: Hearings on S. 3441
and S. 966 Before the Subcomm. On Health of the S. Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare,
93d Cong. 55-56 (1973) [hereinafter Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry Hearings,
Part 1] (text of S. 966, 93d Cong. § 102 (1973)).
250. Id. at 56.
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a National Drug Testing and Evaluation Center within the FDA to oversee
intramural clinical investigations of new drugs.251 The Secretary of the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) would decide whether
the drug would be tested by the National Drug Testing and Evaluation
Center, or by a qualified independent organization staffed by experts that
the Secretary engaged.252 Drug companies would finance the establishment
and maintenance of the Center, and the expenses for conducting the clinical
trials by paying into a common fund, from which the Secretary would draw
to pay for drug testing costs.253 The Secretary of HEW would publicize the
“methodology, results, and conclusions of all tests and investigations.”254
Drug sponsors could still conduct their own clinical trials, subject to
regulation by HEW and public disclosure of the testing methods and
results.255
D. 1973-1980: The Kennedy Hearings
Senator Ted Kennedy chaired hearings entitled, Examination of the
Pharmaceutical Industry in 1973-74,256 and hearings entitled, Preclinical
and Clinical Testing by the Pharmaceutical Industry from 1975 through
1979.257 Kennedy examined the Nelson proposal for independent drug
testing, among other issues.258
During the presidencies of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, at the
hearings in 1974 and 1976, Charles Edwards, HEW Assistant Secretary for
Health, and FDA Commissioner Alexander Schmidt, opposed Senator

251. Id.
252. Id. at 55-56.
253. Id. at 60-61.
254. Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry Hearings, Part 1, supra note 249, at 63
(text of S. 966, at § 102).
255. Id.
256. Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1973-74: Legislation Amending the Public
Health Service Act and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Parts 1-7: Hearings on S.
3441 and S. 966 Before the Subcomm. On Health of the S. Comm. on Labor and the Public
Welfare, 93d Cong. (1973-74).
257. Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1975-76, Parts 1-3:
Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health of the S. Comm. On Labor and Public Welfare
and the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
94th Cong. (1975-76); Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the Pharmaceutical Industry, 197778, Parts 4-5: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Health and Scientific Research of the S.
Comm. on Human Res., 95th Cong. (1977-78); Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the
Pharmaceutical Industry, 1979: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Health and Scientific
Research of the S. Comm. on Labor & Human Res., 96th Cong. (1979) [hereinafter Preclinical
and Clinical Testing, 1979].
258. See Preclinical and Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 210, at 161.
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Nelson’s proposal to create a national drug-testing center.259 FDA
Commissioner Schmidt acknowledged that some investigators made
questionable decisions about their study design, controls, and reporting that
minimized the chance of discovering toxicity.260 However, he argued,
economic incentives and tort liability made it good business for drug firms to
carry out proper studies.261 Further, the “professional integrity of
toxicologists in the industry” helped to assure overall high quality
investigations.262 Schmidt admitted that there would be no bias if the federal
government tested drugs.263 But, he argued, having the federal government
or independent labs perform the work would not necessarily improve the
quality of testing.264 In order to improve the quality of drug testing, he
announced that the FDA would create regulations for assuring “good
laboratory practice” (GLPs) in animal testing, including the inspection of
animal testing facilities, and auditing or reviewing any data where there is
suspicion of falsification.265 Additionally, Schmidt said the FDA would
consider the feasibility of instituting federal certification for testing
laboratories.266

259. Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1973-74, Part 5: Hearings on S. 3441
and S. 966 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the S. Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare,
93d Cong. 2162-63, 2282-83 (1974) [hereinafter Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry
Hearings, Part 5]. Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1975, Part 1:
Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health of the S. Comm. On Labor and Public Welfare
and the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
94th Cong. 24, 29-30, (1975) [hereinafter Preclinical and Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 1].
Preclinical and Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 210, at 81-82. “Senator, you are
assuming that we could do it better than industry, and I have some disagreement with that. I
think the problem is not the system per se, but in the monitoring that we carry on of the
system. We have underway at FDA, and have had for a couple of years an improved
surveillance system of these clinical investigations that are being carried on behalf of the
manufacturer. . . There is nothing wrong with the system. It is good, but we have over the years
done a very poor job of surveillance, if you will, but I think first of all there is not enough talent
to go around in terms of having the drug industry involved in clinical testing along with the
Federal Government.” Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry Hearings, Part 5, supra at
2163 (emphasis added).
260. Preclinical and Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 1, supra note 259, at 24, 29-30;
Preclinical and Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 210, at 81-82.
261. Preclinical and Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 210, at 92-93.
262. Id. at 45.
263. Id. at 103.
264. Id. at 104.
265. Id. at 47.
266. Preclinical and Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 210, at 48. Specifically,
see Commissioner Schmidt’s discussion of Good Laboratory Practices, id. at 47, 98-99; site
inspection and monitoring, id. at 48, 99-100,105; and retrospective review of data id. at 48,
100. In response to Commissioner Schmidt’s testimony, Senator Nelson argued that even with
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Commissioner Schmidt reported that the FDA had rejected the idea of
having the federal government conduct drug testing.267 Instituting federal
testing was not feasible in the short term, he said, because the federal
government lacked sufficient personnel and testing facilities.268 Moreover,
due to the dearth of independent laboratories at the time, it was not
possible to have independent third parties perform the testing.269 Schmidt
also argued that it would be too costly to have the federal government
conduct drug testing. “[T]here is no way that we can get the resources to put
into this that drug companies do.”270 It would be hard to justify federal
spending, he said, unless the government controlled how the resources were
used, which would result in the government setting research priorities.271
Furthermore, he argued, because “I believe that all monopolies, whether
public or private, tend to stagnate, the prospect of any single institution
gaining such control over all preclinical drug investigation troubles me.”272
Both Commissioner Schmidt and HEW Assistant Secretary Edwards
testified that having the FDA engage in or select firms to perform drug
testing would mire the FDA in conflicting roles, because the FDA would
ultimately be the party to evaluate the research performed under its aegis.273

increased FDA oversight, the same problems would continue, and so there was a need for the
reforms of drug testing that he proposed.
What disturbs me about this presentation today is not the facts that we were presented,
Dr. Schmidt. It is the fact that it is an old, old, old case. Dr. Goddard said the same
thing 10, 12, 14 years ago. Dr. Ley, who succeeded Dr. Goddard, said the same
thing. Dr. Edwards succeeded Dr. Ley and he said the same thing. Now Dr. Schmidt is
before us laying down the same case. In 1966, the then FDA Commissioner Dr. James
Goddard gave a speech on this issue . . . . Nothing really of significance has been
done since then . . . . In 1969, seven years ago, I went to the FDA, and we sat down
with the FDA employees and drafted a third party testing bill. We introduced it 7 years
ago in 1969. We introduced it in 1971. We introduced it in 1973. We introduced it in
1975. I have not seen a single agency thus far endorse the concept or the idea or be
excited or interested in it . . . . So it ends up languishing here.
He later continued, “[I] would hate to be sitting here 6 years from now with the next
Commissioner coming in with another case so we can say, now, 14 years or 15 years have
gone by, 16 years, instead of 10, since Goddard, who was not the first one to raise the issue.”
Id. at 157-158.
267. Id. at 103.
268. Id. at 104.
269. Id.
270. Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry Hearings, Part 5, supra note 259, at
2164-65.
271. Preclinical and Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 210, at 103.
272. Id.
273. Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry Hearings, Part 5, supra note 259, at
2163-65 (statement of Charles C. Edwards, Assistant Secretary for Health, Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare).
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Edwards contended, “the public would be deprived of . . . FDA impartial
review of clinical data.”274 Senator Nelson replied that, unlike the FDA, drug
sponsors had an economic bias in having drugs approved.275 Commissioner
Schmidt claimed that all that was needed to ensure reliable trials was
increased FDA oversight, but that this required granting the FDA authority to
issue subpoenas, examine records, and conduct investigations.276 Edwards
said that a government center would not necessarily do a better job of
testing drugs than drug firms, and that countering industry bias could be
achieved through better government surveillance.277
Both the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA) and the AMA
opposed the creation of a national drug testing and evaluation center. PMA
president Joseph Stetler argued that the proposal incorrectly assumed, “that
scientists will somehow be more objective if their work is done under
government rather than private aegis.”278 He also argued that creating the
center would lead to a “drastic slowing down of drug research.”279 Speaking
for the AMA, Dr. James Sammons argued that operating a drug testing
center under the FDA’s aegis would transform the FDA from a judge of
research conducted by others, into an organization that judged its own
research.280 Both the PMA and AMA opposed another aspect of the
proposal, the idea that drug trials should compare the effectiveness of new
drugs to those on the market, and that the FDA should consider
comparative effectiveness when deciding whether to authorize the sale of a
new drug.281
Meanwhile, evidence continued to accrue showing that many clinical
trials did not comply with legal requirements or clinical investigation
norms.282 Congressional committee hearings continued to report these
findings. The FDA investigations of G. D. Searle in the early 1970s revealed
poor oversight, negligence and fraud in the firm's toxicological drug
274. Id. at 2163.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 2164-65.
277. Id. at 2163 (“There is nothing wrong with the system . . . but we have . . . done a very
poor job of surveillance . . . .”).
278. Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1973-74, Part 6: Hearings on S. 3441
and S. 966 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the S. Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare,
93d Cong. 2526 (1974) [hereinafter Examination of the Pharmaceutical Industry Hearings,
Part 6].
279. Id. at 2494.
280. Id. at 2545 (statement of James H. Sammons, Executive. Vice President Designate,
American Medical Association).
281. Id. at 2525, 2572-73.
282. See Preclinical and Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 210, at 337-39
(statement of Gregory J. Ahart, Director, Manpower and Welfare Division, U.S. General
Accounting Office).
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testing.283 The FDA found multiple examples in which the laboratory not only
failed to conduct biopsies when it should have, but it also failed to report
the presence of lesions discovered in animal subjects.284
Typically, the Searle lab employed two different pathologists to examine
tissue.285 In cases where one pathologist identified a lesion and the other
did not, rather than report both findings or have a third pathologist review
the slides, the lab did not report the presence of a lesion.286 The company
did not require its reports to be signed or dated, and did not have clear
procedures for recording important information, or for editing reported
data.287 Sometimes, the pathologists' reports were edited in order to make
the findings appear more favorable in terms of safety.288 The company was
unable to account for discrepancies between its reports and the raw data.289
In some studies, animals listed as alive were dead, and animals listed as
dead were often listed as alive later.290 The FDA investigation found that,
“the cumulative findings of problems within and across the studies . . .
reveal a pattern of conduct which compromises the scientific integrity of the
studies.”291
An FDA survey of 155 clinical investigators between 1972 and 1974
found that 74% did not comply with one or more legal requirements.292
28% did not adhere to the study protocol, 23% did not keep accurate
records of the patients' condition before, during, and after trial, and 22%
did not retain case records.293 These kinds of problems were not new. They
had been documented in numerous congressional hearings throughout the
1960s and 1970s.294

283. See id. at 1, 24-129 (memorandum from Searle Investigation Task Force to Searle
Investigation Steering Committee).
284. Id. at 36, 66, 76.
285. Id. at 118.
286. Id. at 69.
287. Preclinical and Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 210, at 118.
288. Id. at 76.
289. Id. at 13-15.
290. Id. at 20-22.
291. Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1976, Part 3: Joint
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health of the S. Comm. On Labor and Public Welfare and
the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
94th Cong. 4 (1976) [hereinafter Preclinical and Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 3].
292. Preclinical and Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 210, at 338-39;
BRAITHWAITE, supra note 123, at 84.
293. Preclinical and Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 210, at 340.
294. These problems were analyzed in newspaper articles, by Morton Mintz, many of which
were later published as a book on the FDA and the pharmaceutical industry. MINTZ, supra
note 123. These issues were later analyzed by John Braithwaite’s study of white color crime in
the pharmaceutical industry. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 123.
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At the 1976 hearings, Gregory J. Ahart, of the U.S. Government
Accounting Office (GAO), summarized the GAO's investigation into FDA
drug testing. The GAO concluded that there is, “a lack of assurance that the
data which is finally submitted with the drug applications and upon which
FDA bases its decision to approve a new drug for marketing is accurate and
reliable.”295
Testimonies in 1976 made clear that there were then two types of
problems with drug testing:
first, manufacturers' bias compromised
impartiality, and second, cost pressures lead organization that performed
tests to cut corners and produce poor quality work.296 Having a
governmental agency, rather than the manufacturer, select the organization
that performs the tests would eliminate bias. However, other measures were
needed to control for poor quality work due to economic pressures.
Frank Rauscher, Jr. testified that the National Cancer Institute (NCI) had
addressed both problems in ways that could serve as a model for a
government-supervised program of independent drug testing.297 To control
for bias, the NCI and its outside peer-review committees designed the
research protocol.298 It awarded contracts through competitive bidding, but

295. Preclinical and Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 210, at 335. Specifically,
Mr. Ahart made the following points regarding the GAO’s findings. Preclinical and Clinical
Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 210, at 335. Before 1974 there was no comprehensive
monitoring plan. Since 1972, when FDA began a special survey of clinical investigators, it
found that most clinical investigators were not fully compliant, and that most sponsors were
not adequately monitoring their investigators. Id. at 364-65. In the survey conducted from
1972-74 the FDA found significant (74%) noncompliance with a number of requirements. Id.
at 365. It identified failure in: obtaining patient consent – 35%; keeping accurate records of
the amount of drugs received from sponsors and distributed to subjects – 50%; adhering to
study protocol – 28%; maintaining accurate records reflecting the condition of the patient
before, during, and after the study, and the nature of the laboratory work done and other
therapy administered during the study – 23%; retaining case records as required – 22%;
properly supervising the study – 12%. Id. FDA inspections of sample groups of clinical
investigations under the Bureau of Drugs, the Bureau of Biologics, and of federally sponsored
clinical investigations all reviewed the same types of deficiencies. Id. at 366-67. The FDA did
develop a “comprehensive plan for clinical investigation evaluation” in 1975 that was
intended to enhance/remedy the monitoring efforts, but as of January 1976, was not yet fully
implemented. The FDA made only sparing use of its enforcement tools to improve clinical
investigations. In the period following the ‘62 amendments, there were only two criminal
prosecutions, regulatory letters have been used only once by the Bureau of Biologics and not
at all by the Bureau of Drugs, and the two bureaus combined disqualified only 30
investigators. Id. at 368-69.
296. Preclinical and Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 210, at 1-3.
297. See id. at 145, 148-50 (testimony of Frank J. Rauscher, Jr., Director, National
Cancer Institute); see also BRAITHWAITE, supra note 123, at 104-06 (summarizing Dr.
Schmidt’s testimony which reviews the points covered by Dr. Rauscher).
298. Preclinical and Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 210, at 150.
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only considered laboratories that had no connection to the firms
manufacturing the drugs being tested.299
The NCI used several strategies to counter the risk of contract
laboratories cutting costs in ways that compromised the integrity and quality
of testing. The NCI coded the compounds it sent for testing.300 Therefore,
the tester did not know which chemical it was testing.301 Periodically, the
NCI sent testing labs a compound that it knew had certain carcinogenic or
other effects as a means of ascertaining whether the laboratory performed
tests accurately.302 Moreover, the NCI awarded contracts to multiple
toxicological laboratories as a means of checking the quality of the work,
and to spur quality competition among laboratories.303 The NCI staff
monitored the studies on a nearly day-to-day basis.304 Additionally, the NCI
divided its testing into two separate parts, each of which could be evaluated.
One organization performed the toxicological test and generated the data,
while the second organization performed the data processing and statistical
analysis.305
Following the FDA, GAO, and Senate investigations, the FDA developed
regulations for GLPs for drug testers.306 The FDA also created a system of
bio-research monitoring and inspection.307 However, a 1977 study of 39
laboratories performing toxicology studies found that their compliance with
the GLPs varied between 32% and 98%.308 Surprisingly, university
laboratories had worse records than the commercial laboratories.309 The
FDA monitoring program was well in place by the time of the 1979 study of
28 laboratories, which found that the average compliance rate with GLPs
was only 88%.310 That study found nine examples of inaccurate reporting of
test results from five laboratories.311
Throughout this period, consumer advocates continued to argue that the
government should require independent testing. For example, in 1976, Dr.

299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

Id. at 149-50.
Id. at 144.
See id.
Id. at 150.
See Preclinical and Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 210, at 149-50.
Id. at 144.
Id. at 148.
21 C.F.R. § 58 (2011).
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., COMPLIANCE PROGRAM GUIDANCE MANUAL, CHAPTER 48 –
BIORESEARCH MONITORING (2001).
308. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 123, at 82.
309. Id.
310. JONATHAN D. COOK, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., RESULTS OF THE TOXICOLOGY LABORATORY
INSPECTION PROGRAM (JANUARY – MARCH 1979) 9 (1979).
311. Id. at 19.
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Sydney Wolfe, of Public Citizen’s Health Research Group (HRG), discussed
the issue of drug testing at the Environmental Protection Agency and at the
FDA, and argued that no amount of government surveillance could solve
the fundamental problem of interested parties conducting or overseeing
drug testing.312
I think what we learn . . . is not to allow any more testing by industry or by
companies, who owe their allegiance to industry. This has got to stop. No
kind of surveillance of any kind over conflicted and inadequate data is
going to improve the quality of it. The Government has to step in. It will be
far cheaper for the Government, particularly if we use industry funds, to
funnel out the testing money to reliable companies than to have to expend
$25 million, as you have proposed for FDA, to catch up with lousy industry
data.313

FDA Commissioner Schmidt acknowledged that the relationship between
drug firms and testing laboratories required close scrutiny, but he opposed
the proposals that Dr. Wolfe and others advocated.314
In 1978, Senator Kennedy expressed “serious reservations about the
adequacy” of the FDA’s new monitoring program, and renewed his
hearings.315 Testimony and documents revealed continued negligence and
fraud in drug testing.316 The hearings documented examples of investigators
fabricating data.317 Some investigators submitted case reports providing
results for patients who had not even been research subjects for the
investigational drug.318 Others wrote reports for laboratory work that had
not been performed, or for human research subjects that did not exist.319
Sometimes, investigators submitted data generated for the testing of one
drug in place of data for an entirely different product.320
Another theme the hearings explored concerned the dependence of
some toxicological laboratories on drug firms for their continued operation,

312. Preclinical and Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 3, supra note 291, at 686; CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., 1979 SUMMARY, supra note 214, at 77 (citing Drugs: A Consumer Advocate’s
View, FDA CONSUMER, Dec. 1978 – Jan. 1979, at 10, 13).
313. Preclinical and Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 3, supra note 291, at 691.
314. See id. at 732.
315. Preclinical and Clinical Testing by the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1978, Part 5: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. On Health and Scientific Research of the S. Comm. on Human Res.,
95th Cong. 1 (1978) [hereinafter Preclinical and Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 5].
316. Id. at 1-2.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 7.
319. Id. at 7-8.
320. Preclinical and Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 5, supra note 315, at 42.
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and the employment of their staff.321 Would their dependency induce these
labs to engage in fraud due to fear that the drug firms would not renew their
contracts if they reported unfavorable results? Some witnesses suggested
that drug firms instructed laboratories to fabricate data, a practice that they
called “dry-labeling.”322 Other witnesses and senators expressed concern
that drug testers failed to record data, or would fabricate data, in order to
produce favorable results as a means of ensuring that drug firms would hire
them for subsequent studies.323
E.

The Carter Administration Report on New Drug Regulation

The administration of President Jimmy Carter also reviewed proposals to
reform drug testing and the FDA. The final report of the Department of
Health and Human Services Review Panel on New Drug Regulation, issued
in 1977, discussed numerous issues, including clinical trials.324 It noted:
One of the most troublesome aspects of the present system…is that FDA
must rely almost exclusively on the accuracy and objectivity of industrygenerated data . . . . [B]ecause the company has a financial interest in
successful test results, the present drug testing system contains an inherent
bias which adversely affects the accuracy and acceptably of drug
research.325

The panel distinguished between the risk of fraud and manufacturer bias,
and said that, “present safeguards against the submission of fraudulent test
data appear inadequate to detect and minimize this type of bias.”326 It
explained, that “[t]he most direct means of minimizing the bias in testing is
to have research conducted by investigators who are financially independent
of the drug sponsor.”327
The key options, the panel concluded, were to institute “limited thirdparty testing, complete government testing, or government contracting of
testing.”328 It disfavored limited third-party testing since that would subject

321. Preclinical and Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 210, at 139; BRAITHWAITE,
supra note 123, at 80.
322. Preclinical and Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 3, supra note 291, at 13; BRAITHWAITE,
supra note 123, at 80.
323. Preclinical and Clinical Testing Hearings, Part 2, supra note 210, at 139-42, 158159.
324. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, FINAL REPORT OF THE REVIEW PANEL ON NEW
DRUG REGULATION (1977) [hereinafter REVIEW PANEL ON NEW DRUG REGULATION]. The report is
summarized and discussed in CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 1979 SUMMARY, supra note 214, at
76-77.
325. REVIEW PANEL ON NEW DRUG REGULATION, supra note 324, at 83.
326. Id. at 84-85.
327. Id. at 85-86.
328. Id. at 88.
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more human subjects to tests and would be more expensive than third-party
testing alone.329 The disadvantage of having the federal government
conduct clinical trials, said the panel, was that it “would require that the
government evaluate the results of its own tests . . .” and also “require a
sizable government bureaucracy.”330 Furthermore, it reported, the “FDA
believes that if the government were the only drug tester, it inevitably would
begin to set research priorities and would be in the position of determining
the directions of drug innovation.”331 In contrast, “independent
contracting . . . would constitute a lesser regulatory intrusion . . . .”332 The
panel, therefore, preferred a system under which “the government would be
responsible for hiring and paying independent researchers, with the cost of
research assessed to the sponsor,” and where “[t]he information produced
would be given to both the pharmaceutical sponsor and the FDA for
analysis.”333 It recommended that the FDA institute a pilot program to
“contract with independent parties on behalf of the drug sponsor for the
clinical testing of selected class of drugs,” and that it then “assess the
feasibility . . . of introducing independent contract of clinical testing on a
larger scale.”334
F.

The Drug Regulation Reform Act of 1978

In January 1976, a frustrated Senator Nelson complained that
meaningful drug testing reform would never occur unless the FDA supported
sensible legislative proposals.335 In 1978, the FDA and HEW accepted this
challenge, and supported legislation sponsored by Senator Kennedy and
nine other senators.336 The legislation did not propose full-scale
independent drug testing, but it did propose reforms of the drug review
process, and create some governmental capacity to evaluate drugs.
The Drug Regulation Reform Act of 1978 proposed major restructuring
of the drug approval process.337 It also reduced FDA control over initial

329. Id.
330. REVIEW PANEL ON NEW DRUG REGULATION, supra note 324, at 88-89.
331. Id. at 89.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 7-8, 90.
335. Id. at 157-60.
336. Drug Regulation Reform Act of 1978: Hearings on S. 2755 Before the Subcomm. on
Health and Scientific Research of the S. Comm. on Human Res., 95th Cong. 1-3 (1978)
[hereinafter Drug Regulation Reform Act of 1978 Hearings] (indicating the nine co-sponsors:
Sens. Alan Cranston (CA), Thomas F. Eagleton (MO), William D. Hathaway (ME), Jacob K.
Javits (NY), Gaylord Nelson (WI), Claiborne Pell (RI), Jennings Randolph (WV), Donald W.
Riegle, Jr. (MI), and Harrison A. Williams, Jr. (NJ)).
337. Id. at 2-3.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2012]

INDEPENDENT CLINICAL TRIALS TO TEST DRUGS

157

clinical testing in humans, while increasing its oversight in the later
phases.338 The Act increased the FDA’s role in overseeing the design and
implementation of testing protocols, and expanded the disclosure
requirements for clinical trial data.339 Section 132 authorized the Secretary
to write guidelines for later phases of drug trials.340 The Secretary could
deny applications for drug testing on numerous grounds, including when
“[T]he proposed plan for the development of the drug product is not
adequate to meet its stated objectives,” and when “[T]he proposed
investigations are inadequate to meet their stated objectives.”341
The bill created a “National Center for Clinical Pharmacology” within
HEW, separate from the FDA, to conduct some intramural public clinical
pharmacology research.342 The Center would publish an annual Drug
Experience Assessment Report, based on its ongoing review and analysis of
the use of drug products in the United States, including a qualitative analysis
of the use of currently available drug products, and the adverse effects and
other unanticipated reactions from such products.343 The Center’s functions
included:
[C]onduct[ing] and support[ing] research in clinical pharmacology and
clinical pharmacy, including investigations (1) of the safety and effectiveness

338. Briefly, § 127 of the bill established “Drug Innovation Investigations,” defined as
investigations using “small numbers of human participants. . .intended to examine the clinical
pharmacology of a drug entity or drug product in humans, to assess preliminarily its risks and
effectiveness, or. . .biological mechanisms in humans.” Id. at 98-99 (text of Senate Bill 2755).
Under this section, applicants to conduct such innovations submit an application to FDA,
including a description of the product, reports of previous investigations, and the proposed
protocol for the investigation, including inter alia the maximum number of humans to be
included, the names of the investigators, and any other information that is “necessary for the
Secretary” to make a determination. Id. at 101-102. The applications would presumptively be
accepted unless the Secretary concluded within thirty days that the proposed investigation
would subject human participants to “unreasonable and significant risk,” or that it would fail
to satisfy the requirements of subsection (f). Id. at 97-98. Subsection (f) in turn required that
the investigation registrant, among other things: distribute the drug product only to “experts
who are qualified by scientific training and experience to investigate the drug . . . in
humans . . .” (id. at 102) (note that the testing firm still retains control over who the
investigators are, though they must disclose the investigators’ names with the initial
application”); “establish and maintain records, and submit reports to the Secretary, regarding
the investigation to enable the Secretary to determine whether the conditions of registration
are being fulfilled” (id.); and report to the Secretary “information regarding newly discovered
risks of the drug product to enable the Secretary to determine whether human participants are
being subjected to an unreasonable and significant risk of illness or injury” (id. at 102-103).
339. Id. at 105, 109-110.
340. Id. at 122-23 (§ 132).
341. Drug Regulation Reform Act of 1978 Hearings, supra note 336, at 107.
342. Id. at 227.
343. Id. at 228-29.
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of existing and new uses of drug products, (2) for the development of drug
products for diseases and other conditions of low incidence, (3) of drug
products of special significance or with respect to which there is substantial
controversy as to safety and effectiveness and for which there have been
either no or minimal investigations, and (4) to otherwise facilitate
breakthroughs in research on drug products.344

Several controversial provisions of the bill provoked opposition from the
pharmaceutical industry, physicians, and some consumer advocates.345 The
bill was never reported out of committee.346
By October 1979, FDA regulations regarding clinical investigations had
not been finalized, and acting FDA commissioner Sherwin Gardner was
reciting the same old sponsor-responsibility catechism: that the FDA neither
could nor should oversee drug trials used for approving drugs.347
Senator Kennedy’s 1979 hearings documented 31 cases of flawed
clinical trials due to individual investigators engaging in fraud, falsifying
patient records, misrepresenting medical histories of research subjects,
violating trial protocols, and breaching numerous other FDA rules.348 Acting
FDA Commissioner Sherwin Gardner reported that the FDA had audited
trials to detect poor quality and fraud.349 The FDA found the bulk of
research acceptable, but revealed that the work of some investigators
“represent[ed] sloppy science, disregard for the rights of test subjects, and
misrepresentations of test data.”350 To address these problems, Gardner
reported that the FDA was exploring several options. These included
disqualifying misbehaving investigators from conducting trials, referring
cases of misconduct for criminal prosecution, and developing new
regulations.351 Simultaneously, and much to Senator Kennedy’s chagrin, the
FDA was contemplating the elimination of requirements for drug sponsors to
check their investigators’ raw data.352
In the 1980 election, Ronald Reagan was elected President of the
United States, Senator Gaylord Nelson lost his bid for re-election to the
Senate, and Senate majority shifted from the Democratic to the Republican

344. Id. at 228.
345. Id. at 956-61 (statement of Barbara Moulton, National Consumers League).
346. Drug Regulation Reform Act of 1978 Hearings, supra note 336, at 956-1015
(statement of Barbara Moulton, National Consumers League).
347. Preclinical and Clinical Testing, 1979, supra note 257, at 13.
348. See generally id.
349. Id. at 9-10.
350. Id. at 10.
351. Id. at 10, 14.
352. Preclinical and Clinical Testing, 1979, supra note 257, at 13.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2012]

INDEPENDENT CLINICAL TRIALS TO TEST DRUGS

159

party.353 This change ended Congressional proposals for independent drug
testing. Discussion of independent drug testing in medical and popular
journals then virtually ceased until the 1990s.
V. REVISITING PROPOSALS FOR INDEPENDENT DRUG TESTING
A.

Alternative Approaches to Ensure the Integrity of Drug Testing

Since the FDA promulgated regulations in 1970 that specified the
evidence it would use to evaluate drug safety and effectiveness, it has either
ignored or opposed proposals for independent testing. To counter problems
of fraud, bias and poorly designed trials conducted by drug firms, it
developed extensive regulations on how to conduct toxicological tests and
clinical trials. It also monitored clinical research used to support NDAs.
Nevertheless, over the last quarter century, governmental evaluations,
studies on medical research, civil and criminal investigations, and tort suits
have continued to reveal bias and fraud in drug-firm sponsored research.
The FDA could increase its regulation and oversight of manufacturersponsored drug testing, yet there are limits on what that can accomplish
because such regulation does not remove the source of compromising
influences.
Having the federal government contract with organizations to test drugs
would be a significant change but constitutes a more modest alteration than
another reform proposal: public financing of clinical trials to test drugs.354
Proponents of public financing argue that it would curb research bias and
fraud and ensure public access to clinical trial data, thereby improving our
knowledge of drug risks and benefits. Even more important, they say, public
funding could reduce spending on pharmaceuticals and increase access to
drug therapy. Current policies grant drug firms a time-limited monopoly
through patents and marketing exclusivity as an incentive to invest the funds
needed to bring new drugs to market, about half of which pays to conduct
clinical trials.355 If these clinical trials were publicly funded, the cost to drug

353. Peter Temin, Government Actions In Times Of Crisis: Lessons From The History Of
Drug Regulation, 18 J. SOC. HIST. 433, 437 (1985); Nelson, Gaylord Anton, BIOGRAPHICAL
DIRECTORY OF THE U.S. CONG., http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=
n000033 (last visited Nov. 17, 2012).
354. See Part III, Contemporary Proposals for Independent Drug Testing, particularly notes
101 through 102 and accompanying text.
355. See WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30756,
PATENT LAW AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: AN EXAMINATION OF THE
DRUG PRICE COMPETITION AND PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1984 (“THE HATCH-WAXMAN
ACT”) (2005). See also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY, POSTMARKETING
STUDIES AND CLINICAL TRIALS – IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 505(O)(3) OF THE FEDERAL FOOD,
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firms of bringing drugs to market would be cut in half. Consequently,
legislation could also reduce the duration of drug patents and market
exclusivity, and that would lower the amount that the federal government
spends to purchase drugs for Medicare, Medicaid, the Veteran’s
Administration and the Department of Defense. Those savings could pay for
the cost of funding the clinical trials.356
Despite the significant potential benefits of publicly funded trials,
Congress is unlikely to enact this reform in the short term because it would
require major changes in financing and patent policy. In contrast,
independent drug testing would also improve the integrity of research and
ensure public access to clinical trial data without the federal government
incurring up-front expenses or changes in intellectual property law, making it
an easier reform to enact.
B.

Assessing the Arguments Against Independent Testing

Let us review the key arguments used to oppose proposals for
independent drug testing.
In the 1960s and 1970s, opponents argued that independent drug
testing was not feasible because there were insufficient independent private
organizations to conduct toxicological tests and clinical trials, and the
federal government also lacked the capacity to perform this work.357 These
assertions assumed that private firms and the federal government could not
expand their capacities to meet new demands. That was probably not
correct in the early 1960s and 1970s, and it is certainly not true now.
Today, rather than test drugs in-house, drug firms contract out this work to
third parties. Initially, universities performed most of this research but over
the last quarter century drug firms shifted most of their clinical trials to forprofit CROs, which now constitute a global industry.358 However, testing by
third parties is not independent today. The drug manufacturer either designs
the clinical trial or directs and oversees researchers who do, and it selects
the organization that conducts the research. Contract researchers, whether
DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT (2011), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/Gui
danceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM172001.pdf.
356. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 102. Some public funding proposals would have the
federal government directly fund the clinical trials. See, e.g., Lewis et al., supra note 101.
Other proposals would have drug firms obtain research funds and conduct trials in the same
manner they do now but instead of rewarding firms that develop innovative drugs by granting
patents and market exclusivity, the federal government would award a monetary prize to the
innovator, obtain rights to the drug, and then allow multiple firms to manufacture and market
the drugs. Love & Hubbard, supra note 101; Pogge, supra note 102.
357. See Part IV.D, particularly notes 257, 265-267 and accompanying text.
358. See MASRI ET AL., supra note 81; see Rettig, supra note 81; see also Part II, notes 1112 and accompanying text.
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in CROs or universities, depend on the drug manufacturer for their income
and must follow its directions if they want to receive contracts in the future.
Public policy could promote the independence of existing contract
research organizations and universities if a governmental agency selected
the entity that performed the clinical trials and monitored its work, either
directly or through an intermediary. Furthermore, by allocating funds for the
research, the agency could spur the growth of organizations that met high
standards for integrity, excellence, and independence. Through contracts, it
could encourage the growth of organizations such as the internationally
recognized Mario Negri Pharmacological Institute, which has performed
independent clinical trials in Europe for nearly 50 years, published more
than 13,000 original scientific papers in scientific journals and now
conducts about 80 clinical trials a year.359
Independent testing, its opponents also argued, would not ensure that
clinical trials were well designed, free of methodological flaws, or conducted
competently. Even if a governmental agency selected the researchers,
opponents argued, researchers might perform sloppy work or engage in
fraud. They suggested that it was therefore not important or valuable to
ensure independent testing.360 No doubt, independent testing does not
guarantee that drug evaluation will be performed well. However, that only
shows that independence is not sufficient to ensure accurate drug testing. It
does not show that independence is not an important factor or a necessary
condition for accurate drug testing. Moreover, the National Cancer
Institute’s experience in contracting with laboratories to test chemicals
demonstrates that regulators can monitor and control the quality of
contracted testing.361
Opponents also claimed that having the federal government test drugs
would create a conflict of interest that would compromise FDA drug
approval decisions because the government would then both conduct
clinical trials and evaluate those trials when it decided whether or not to
grant marketing approval. The federal government should not conduct
clinical trials, they argued, because it should not be in the position of
evaluating its own work.362

359. See Donald W. Light, Trustworthiness and Integrity in Pharmaceutical Research: What
can we learn from the Anti-Corruption Practices of the Mario Negri Institute of Pharmaceutical
Research? (Sept. 13, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). See also Home,
ISTITUTO DI RICERCHE FARMACOLOGICHE MARRIO NEGRI (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.marione
gri.it/mn/en/.
360. See Part IV.D, particularly note 262 and accompanying text.
361. See Part IV.D, particularly notes 297-305 and accompanying text.
362. See Part IV.D, particularly notes 230-233, 273-281 and accompanying text.
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There is irony in opposing government drug testing on the grounds that
it is mired by conflicts of interest. The impetus for government-sponsored
testing — performed either by public employees or through contracts with
researchers in the private sector — is to remove the conflict of interest
present when a firm evaluates its products. The issue, therefore, is whether
government-sponsored testing creates more or less bias than when drug
firms test their own products. Drug manufacturers have a systemic bias in
favor of their products while governmental agencies do not have a systemic
bias in favor of or against any particular product. Certainly, some individual
governmental personnel might harbor a bias toward a firm or a product. But
that is unlikely to systematically slant all testing.
Granted, a governmental agency that conducts clinical trials may not
objectively evaluate its own trials. However, government testing is possible
without having the same agency both conduct clinical trials and evaluate the
quality of those trials. Simply have one governmental agency conduct
clinical trials and designate another agency to evaluate the research. The
NIH could conduct clinical trials and the FDA could evaluate those trials,
just as it currently evaluates clinical trials conducted by drug firms. In fact,
government agencies frequently evaluate the work of other government
programs. For example, the Government Accountability Office provides
independent evaluation of federal programs. And the Congressional
Research Service provides impartial evaluations of legislative proposals and
legislative history. Furthermore, it is easy to eliminate the problem of having
government agencies evaluate the work of government employees. Simply
have the governmental agency evaluate clinical trials performed by private
contractors. Most of the proposals for independent drug testing, in fact,
have the FDA evaluate research conducted by private contractors and they
also have a separate agency select the contract researchers.
Another drawback of independent testing, opponents claim, is that it
would further slow the introduction of new drugs. This assertion is
unpersuasive. Currently it requires about 15 years from the beginning of
drug development until a drug can be tested and marketed.363 Phase I
clinical trials in humans take about a year and a half.364 Phase II clinical
trials typically take two years;365 and phase III clinical trials take three to five
years. Review by the FDA can take up to two years but in recent years the
FDA drug review, on average, has been completed in just over a year.366
Independent testing is unlikely to cause much delay and there are ways to
take care of problems any delay would cause for manufacturers.
363.
364.
365.
366.

ROWBERG, supra note 66, at 9.
Id.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 14.
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In principle, it should not take longer for contract researchers to conduct
a clinical trial merely because a governmental agency hires it, rather than a
drug firm. It might take a governmental agency longer than a drug firm to
select which researchers to employ, but not much. And if ensuring that
clinical trials are better designed and methodologically sound extends the
time to develop the research protocol, that would be time well spent.
Furthermore, the Hatch-Waxman Act already extends for up to five years the
period of market exclusivity for manufacturers of new drugs to compensate
them for part of the time it takes to conduct clinical trials and for the FDA to
review NDAs.367 Regulations could increase the period of market exclusivity
to account for any increased time taken to conduct clinical trials using the
new process.
C. Challenges to Controlling Private Research Organization Conflicts of
Interest
Having a government agency select the private organizations that
conduct clinical trials would not necessarily remove all conflicts of interest.
Presumably CROs or universities might earn only part of their income from
federal government contracts and, therefore, they might also earn most of
their income from work from drug manufacturers. If organizations selected
by government agencies depended on receiving discretionary contracts from
drug manufacturers for most of their income, such dependence would
create a significant conflict of interest.368 The drug manufacturer could
retaliate against researchers that produced negative evaluations of their
products for government-sponsored testing by ceasing to employ them in
the future. The risk of losing contracts from drug manufacturers could lead
researchers and research organizations to conduct their government testing
in ways that favored the manufacturer of drugs they test.
The simplest and most effective way to address this problem is to
prohibit all firms and organizations that accept federal contracts for drug
evaluation from performing any direct work for drug manufacturers.
However, fewer research organizations could thrive without doing any work
367. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, 35
U.S.C. (2006)). See ROWBERG, supra note 66.
368. This sort of conflict of interest also occurs when independent medical review
organizations evaluate decisions of insurers to deny medical services. Even when public
authorities select the review organization, the review organizations often depend on the insurer
whose decisions they assess. Typically these review organizations earn much of their income
from performing other work for insurers. Insurers that are displeased with a decision of an
independent review organization can select another organization to employ for this work. See
Marc A. Rodwin, New Standards for Medical Review Organizations: Holding Them and Health
Plans Accountable For Their Decisions, 30 HEALTH AFF. 519, 520 (2011).
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for drug firms and so adopting that rule would reduce the pool of
organizations willing to accept federal drug testing contracts. With fewer
research organizations from which to choose, the federal government might
have more difficulty finding organizations capable of performing high quality
work.
An alternative strategy is to reduce the prevalence of conflicts of interest
rather than preclude them. The agency awarding drug evaluation contracts
could offer work only to CROs that earned 40 percent or less of their
revenue from drug manufacturers. Regulations could also direct the agency
to give preference in awarding contracts to organizations that received ten
percent or less of their revenue from drug manufacturers, when such
organizations were available and well qualified.
To further reduce the risk from conflicts of interest and improve the
quality of clinical trials, the federal government could also contract with
experts to evaluate the proposed research design and protocol before
authorizing the start of the clinical trial. It probably makes sense to require
public disclosure of the proposed research protocol and the comments of
experts that evaluated it and to allow the public to comment on the
proposed research protocol. Based on the expert evaluation and public
comment, the government agency could ask the research organization to
revise its trial design and research protocol.
D. Implementing Independent Drug Testing: Begin with New Drugs
We can distinguish three categories of drug trials: (1) those used to
support an application to market a new drug; (2) post-marketing trials
required by the FDA as a condition for granting marketing approval; (3)
other post marketing approval trials not required by the FDA. Independent
testing could be used for all three categories, but reform should start with
independent testing to support NDAs.
Federal law already requires that drug companies submit evidence on
drug safety and effectiveness when they seek approval to market a new
drug. Moreover, FDA regulations specify how drug firms must conduct these
trials. Since the FDA already sets standards for clinical trials used for drug
approval, it probably has authority to promulgate regulations that require
such clinical trials be designed and conducted by an independent
organization selected and supervised by a federal agency. In any event,
Congress could implement this policy by amending the FDCA without
regulating other clinical trials for drugs.
The FDA also has jurisdiction over certain post-marketing trials because
FDA regulations require that drug manufacturers monitor the risks of drugs
they market. Manufacturers must submit to the FDA results from their postmarketing trials but often the FDA does not specify what manufacturers must
do to fulfill their post-marketing commitments. Sometimes, however, the
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FDA specifies the kind of post-marketing trial that a drug manufacturer must
perform, particularly if the NDA revealed evidence of potential serious drug
risks.369
In principle, the FDA or Congress could require that drug firms finance
independent clinical trials for these post-marketing studies. However,
ensuring that these trials are carried out would require an expansion of FDA
authority. Until enactment of the Food and Drug Administration
Amendments Act of 2007, the FDA lacked authority to compel drug firms to
conduct post-marketing studies of approved drugs.370 Drug firms often did
not complete or delayed conducting these studies.371 One reason for this is
that the FDA lacks the ability to routinely stop a manufacturer from
marketing an approved drug. In contrast, regulatory authorities in the
European Union have such power because authorization to market a new
drug expires after five years unless the European Medicine Agency approves
a renewal application.372
Drug firms also conduct clinical trials for approved drugs that are not
require by the FDA. Typically they conduct such studies to help market their
products. They may design these trials to demonstrate that a drug is more
effective, safer, or more cost-effective than competing drugs or non-drug
therapies, or to explore an approved drug’s potential benefits for new uses.
It will be much harder to require that these trials be funded by drug firms but
conducted independently.
The federal government lacks leverage to require independent testing
for these studies because federal law does not require drug manufacturers
to supply the FDA evidence that these studies are designed to produce.
Manufacturers therefore have the option of not funding such clinical trials
and that makes it harder for the FDA to regulate how such studies must be
conducted. If Congress wants independent clinical trials to evaluate the
comparative efficacy of approved drugs it will probably have to finance
these studies. Alternatively, Congress could pass legislation that requires
manufacturers to submit such data to the FDA, which would then give the
FDA jurisdiction over such research.

369. 21 C.F.R. § 314.80-.81 (2012).
370. Peter P. Chang, Reauthorization of PDUFA: An Exercise in Post-Market Drug Safety
Reform, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 196 (2008).
371. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, OEI-01-04-00390,
FDA’S MONITORING OF POSTMARKETING STUDY COMMITMENTS (2006). For a discussion of this
problem and attempts to address it, see INST. OF MED., COMM. ON THE ASSESSMENT OF THE
U.S. DRUG SAFETY SYSTEM, THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE
HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC 55, 155-57 (2007).
372. Commission Regulation 726/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 136) 35.
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